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ABSTRACT

Six years ago, Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), for the first
time giving the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) the power
to seek monetary penalties through its in-house adjudication. The SEC
already had the power to seek such penalties in federal court. With the
Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC's enforcement division could now choose
between an adjudication before an SEC Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ) or a civil action before an Article III judge. With this new choice,
the SEC realized a significant home-court advantage. For example, in
2014, the SEC's enforcement division prevailed in 100% of its
administrative proceedings, while it prevailed in only 61% of the cases
it brought in federal court. With these statistics, it is no surprise that
potential respondents to SEC enforcement actions soon challenged the
constitutionality of the SEC's new choice.
In this Article, we explain why the SEC ALJs' appointment and
removal processes violate the United States Constitution. The SEC
ALJs are inferior officers of the United States. As such, they must be
appointed by the President, a court of law, or the head of a department.
Instead, they are appointed by the head SEC ALJ. Additionally, in Free
Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board,' the

' Originally published in the Southern Methodist University Law Review. See
Jellum, Linda and Tincher, Moses, The Shadow of Free Enterprise: The
Unconstitutionality of the Securities & Exchange Commission's Administrative
Law Judges (Feb. 17, 2017). SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW,
Vol. 70, 2017. Available at SSRN: https://ssm.com/abstract-2919644. Reprinted
with the permission of the Southern Methodist University Law Review and both
authors, Linda D. Jellum and Moses M. Tincher.
* Linda Jellum is the Ellison C. Palmer Sr. Professor of Law at Mercer
University School of Law. She teaches Federal Income Tax, Administrative Law,
and Statutory Interpretation. In addition to teaching, Professor Jellum is a prolific
scholar and has written extensively. Her articles have appeared in top law journals,
such as the Southern Methodist Law Review, the Miami Law Review, the UCLA
Law Review, and the Ohio State Law Journal. She has also authored multiple
books and book chapters on statutory interpretation. Professor Jellum has been a
leader in legal education. She is currently the Treasurer for the Southeastern
Association of Law Schools; Chair of the Association of American Law School's
Section on Administrative Law; and Vice-chair for American Bar Association
Section's on Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice. Formerly, she served as
the Deputy Director for the Association of American Law Schools. Professor

Fall 2017

The Shadow of Free Enterprise

613

Supreme Court held that dual for-cause removal provisions violate
separation of powers because such clauses prevent the President from
faithfully executing the law. The SEC ALJs are subject to multiple forcause removal protections. Possibly, the Supreme Court will refuse to
extend its holding in Free Enterprise- that multiple levels of tenure
protection violate separation of powers-to ALJs. However, if the
Court meant what it said and if the case is to have any relevance
beyond the agency involved in that case, then the multiple for-cause
removal provisions affecting the SEC ALJs specifically, and all ALJs
generally, will need to be reconsidered.

Jellum received her J.D. from Cornell Law School and her undergraduate degree
from Cornell University. She has the unique honor of having sat for and passed five
states' bar exams.
** Moses Tincher is a law clerk for a federal district court judge. After his
clerkship, he will join the litigation team at Troutman Sanders. Moses is a
Woodruff Scholar who received his J.D. from Mercer Law School and graduated
second in his class. He also graduated summa cum laude from Emory University,
where he received his undergraduate degrees in Psychology and Economics. In his
spare time, Moses enjoys singing, cooking Korean food, and performing magic.
1561 U.S. 477, 483-84 (2010).
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I. INTRODUCTION

In 2016, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) brought
a record number of enforcement actions. 2 The SEC's new Chair,
Mary Jo White, credited changes in the agency's approach for the
uptick: "Over the last three years, we have changed the way we do
business on the enforcement front by using new data analytics to
uncover fraud, enhancing our ability to litigate tough cases, and
expanding the playbook bringing novel and significant actions to
better protect investors and our markets." 3 Others credit White's
policy that "there's no violation or potential violation that's too small
to go after," for the increase. 4 While the truth likely lies somewhere
in between, Congress played a significant role in the agency's
transformation. Six years ago, Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank
Act,5 for the first time giving the SEC the power to seek monetary
penalties in its in-house adjudications. The SEC already had the
power to seek such penalties in federal court. 6 With the Dodd-Frank
Act, the SEC's enforcement division could choose which forum to
use: an adjudication before an SEC Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
or a civil action before an Article III judge.7
With this new forum, the SEC soon realized it had a significant
home-court advantage. A recent Wall Street Journal study found that
from October 2010 to March 2015, the SEC's enforcement division
2 2.P.J. D'Annunzio, No Violation 'Too Small' as SEC Sets Enforcement

Record,

Law.Com

(Oct.11,

2016),

http://www.law.com/sites/almstaff/2016/10/11/no-violation-too-small-as-sec-setsenforcementrecord/?kw-No%20Violation%2OToo%2OSmall%2Oas%2OSEC%2OSets%20Enfor
cement/o20Record&et-editorial&bu=Daily%2OReport&cn=20161013&src=EMC-

Email&pt-Moming%20News&slreturn-20160930151208[https://perma.cc/MV3JASZU] (noting that "[t]here

were 868 enforcement actions this fiscal year

compared with 807 in 2015 and 755 in 2014").
3 Id.
4 Id.

5 See generally Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1376-2223 (2010) (codified in scattered
sections of U.S.C. tits. 7, 12, 15, 22, and 42).
6 See Bebo v. SEC, 799 F.3d 765, 768 (7th Cir. 2015).
7 7.Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act §
1055(a)(1).
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prevailed in 86% of the proceedings it brought in-house, while it
prevailed in 70% of the cases it brought in federal court.8 Indeed,
from October 2013 to January 2015, the SEC won 219 in-house
adjudications in a row. 9 In fiscal year 2014, the SEC's enforcement
division prevailed in 100% of its administrative proceedings, while it
prevailed in only 61% of the cases it brought in federal court. 10
Perceiving these statistics to be accurate, it is no surprise that
potential respondents to SEC enforcement actions soon challenged
the constitutionality of the SEC's new choice." Relatedly, the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) was recently impacted by similar
challenges. On March 23, 2016, the House passed a bill that would
strip the FTC's power to adjudicate antitrust cases through its
administrative process following a court's denial of an FTC
preliminary injunction request.12 Assuming this bill becomes law, all
antitrust cases will have to be brought in federal court.
The first constitutional challenges plaintiffs filed in the SEC
cases raised equal protection and due process claims. 13 In these
challenges, the plaintiffs alleged that the SEC's administrative
proceedings do not provide the same degree of procedural protections
and fairness that are afforded in federal court. 14 These challenges

8 Jean

Eaglesham, Fairness of SEC Judges Is in Spotlight, Wall St. J. (Nov. 22,
2015, 9:25 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/fairness-of-sec-judges-is-in-spotlight1448236970 [https://perma.cc/2Y3H-8GV9].
9 Ryan Jones, The Fight over Home Court: An Analysis of the SEC's
Increased Use of Administrative Proceedings, 68 SMU L. Rev. 507, 509 (2015).
10 See Nate Raymond, U.S. Judge Criticizes SEC Use of In-House Court for
Fraud
Cases,
Reuters
(Nov.
5,
2014,
1:37
PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/05/sec-fraud-rakoffidUSL1NOSV2LN20141105 [https://perma.cc/L9DT-HUG2].
11 At least one academic believes that the SEC statistics are being used
inaccurately and that the SEC is no more likely to prevail before an ALJ than in
court. See generally Urska Velikonja, Reporting Agency Performance: Behind the
SEC's Enforcement Statistics, 101 Cornell L. Rev. 901 (2016).
12 Standard Merger and Acquisition Reviews Through Equal Rules Act of
2015, H.R. 2745, 114th Cong. § 4 (2016).
13 See Bebo v. SEC, 799 F.3d 765, 768 (7th Cir. 2015); see also Chau v. SEC,
72 F. Supp. 3d 417, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); Gupta v. SEC, 796 F. Supp. 2d 503, 514
(S.D.N.Y. 2011).
14 See generally, 799 F.3d at 768; see also Chau, 72 F. Supp. 3d 417 at 420;
Gupta, 796 F. Supp. 2d at507
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have so far proved unsuccessful. Hence, a new round of challenges
has now begun as a result of the Supreme Court's 2010 holding in
Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board.15 In Free Enterprise, the Court held that dual for-cause
removal provisions violate separation of powers because the
President is prevented from faithfully executing the law. 16 The SEC
ALJs are subject to multiple for-cause removal protections; therefore,
plaintiffs added Free Enterprise removal claims to their legal
challenges. 17
The plaintiff in Bebo v. SEC was the first plaintiff to raise a
removal claim.18 On March 3, 2015, Laurie Bebo filed suit in the
Eastern District Court of Wisconsin, arguing, among other things,
that the SEC ALJs' removal structure violated separation of
powers. 19 The court in Bebo found plaintiffs claims to be
"compelling and meritorious;" however, the court held that it lacked
subject matter jurisdiction to hear them. 20 With this ruling, the court
effectively required the plaintiff to raise her claim before the very
tribunal she alleged was unconstitutional. 21 The Seventh Circuit
affirmed. 22
Several months later, the plaintiff in Tilton v. SEC filed a similar
challenge in the Southern District Court of New York, alleging that
the removal scheme for the SEC ALJs was unconstitutional. 23
15 See generally 561 U.S. 477 (2010).
16 Id. at 496; cf Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 684

F.3d 1332-40 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (holding that the Copyright Royalty Board
members are similarly unconstitutionally subject to dual for-cause removal
protection).
17 See Bebo, 799 F.3d at 768; Chau, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 437; Gupta, 796 F.
Supp. 2d at 514.
18 Bebo v. SEC, No. 15-C-3, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25660, at *1 (E.D. Wis.
Mar. 3, 2015).
19

Id. at *2-3.

20 Id. at *3-4 (concluding that the claims were "subject to the exclusive

remedial scheme set forth in the Securities Exchange Act").
21 After Bebo was affirmed by the Seventh Circuit, the Supreme Court denied

certiorari. Bebo v. SEC, 799 F.3d 765, 767 (7th Cir. 2015), cert denied, 136 S. Ct.
1500(2016).
22 Bebo, 799 F.3d at 767.
23 Tilton v. SEC, No. 12-CV-2473, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85015, at *1-2
(S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2015), aff'd, 824 F.3dd 276, 279 (2d Cir. 2016). Tilton recently
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Plaintiff Tilton, however, added a new constitutional claim: not only
are SEC ALJs subject to unconstitutional removal provisions, they
are inferior officers who are not appointed by the SEC
Commissioners, the President, or a court of law. 2 4 Thus, their
appointment violates the Appointments Clause of the United States
Constitution. 25 Just like the court in Bebo, the district court in Tilton
also dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 26
Shortly after Tilton was decided, two federal district courts
rejected both Tilton and Bebo's holdings regarding subject matter
jurisdiction. The Southern District Court of New York and the
Northern District Court of Georgia both concluded that federal courts
had jurisdiction to hear these constitutional challenges. 27 Because the
plaintiffs sought preliminary injunctions and declaratory relief, these
courts next addressed the likelihood that the plaintiffs would succeed
on the merits of their constitutional claims. 28 In doing so, both courts
addressed the appointment claim, finding that because the SEC ALJs
are inferior officers, and because they were not appointed as required,

filed a new complaint with the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief Complaint at 1-2, Tilton v. SEC,
No. 1:16- cv-07048 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2016). The complaint challenges the SEC's
decision not to apply its new procedural rules in Tilton's pending administrative
case. Id. at 2
24 Tilton, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85015, at *5-6.
25 Id.
26 Id.

at *36-37. ("Congress has carefully delineated the distinct roles of the
Commission and the courts in cases such as this. It rests first with the Commission
to determine whether to commence an action at all .... [T]here is no basis to allow
Plaintiffs to bypass this congressionally created remedial scheme. Accordingly, this
Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action."). The Second Circuit
recently affirmed, over a strong dissent, the district court's decision that the case
was impliedly precluded. Tilton v. SEC, 824 F.3d 276, 279 (2d Cir. 2016) (holding
that Congress implicitly precluded federal district court jurisdiction over the
plaintiffs' constitutional claims).
27 See Timbervest, LLC v. SEC, No. 1:15-CV-2106-LMM, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 132082, at *20 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 4, 2015); Gray Fin. Grp., Inc. v. SEC, 166
F. Supp. 1335, 1343, 1349 (N.D. Ga. 2015), vacated and remanded, Hill v. SEC,
825 F.3d 1236, 1252 (11th Cir. 2016); Hill v. SEC, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1306,
1310 (N.D. Ga. 2015), vacated and remanded, Hill v. SEC, 825 F.3d 1236, 1252
(11th Cir. 2016); Duka v. SEC, 103 F. Supp. 3d 382, 385, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
28 See Timbervest, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132082, at *22; Gray, 166 F. Supp.
at 1349-50; Hill, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 1319; Duka, 103 F. Supp. 3d at 392-93.
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their appointment likely violates the Constitution. 29 As for the
removal claim, neither court believed that multiple layers of forcause removal protection were problematic. 30 The plaintiffs,
however, lost these arguments on appeal. 31 Collectively, these cases
raise difficult questions regarding the constitutionality of the SEC
ALJs. These cases could potentially dismantle the entire formal
administrative system.
In this Article, we examine the validity of the claims that the SEC
ALJs' appointment and removal process violates Article II of the
United States Constitution and the separation of powers principle. 32
The importance of the resolution of these issues cannot be overstated.
If the above- discussed plaintiffs' claims are valid, the SEC ALJ
system will need to be revised and the legitimacy of hundreds of past,
pending, and future SEC adjudications will be in doubt. This concern
may explain the SEC's reluctance to correct the appointments issue
with a relatively simple fix. 33 In addition, if the removal structure
violates the Constitution, then the legitimacy of thousands of federal
adjudications held before all ALJs may be at risk because all federal
ALJs are subject to at least dual for-cause removal protections. 34 The
29 Duka v. SEC, 124 F. Supp. 3d 287, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); Timbervest, 2015
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132082, at *35; Gray, 166 F. Supp. at 1354; Hill, 114 F. Supp.
3d at 1319
30 See Hill, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 1319 n.12 (noting that the court "has serious
doubts that ... ALJs likely occupy 'quasi-judicial' or 'adjudicatory' positions, and
thus these two-layer protections likely do not interfere with the President's ability
to perform his duties"); Duka, 103 F. Supp. 3d at 395 (noting that the statutory
restrictions on the removal of SEC ALJs do not "infringe the President's
constitutional authority").
31 Hill v. SEC, 825 F.2d 1236, 1237-38, 1252 (11th Cir. 2016) ("[T]he district
court[s] [in Gray and Hill] erred in exercising jurisdiction. We vacate . . . and
remand with instructions to dismiss each case for lack of jurisdiction."). Duka was
effectively abrogated by Tilton v. SEC, 824 F.3d 276,279 (2d Cir. 2016).
32
U.S. Const. art. II.
3 Duka v. SEC, 15 Civ. 357 (RMB) (SN), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124444, at
*18 n.7 (The court gave the SEC the opportunity to cure any violation of the
Appointments Clause; however, the SEC advised the court that "[a]lthough the
Commission in its adjudicatory capacity may decide in due course whether the SEC
ALJs' appointments violate the Constitution[,] ... the Commission has not issued a
decision or otherwise taken any public action on these questions.").
34 See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477,
478, 487 (2010). But see Kent H. Barnett, Avoiding Independent Agency
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appointment procedure used by other federal agencies is less clear,
but it is likely that the SEC is not alone in bypassing the
constitutionally valid appointment procedure. 35
We proceed as follows: Part II explains the history of the SEC
and its expanding powers, and Part III describes ALJs generally and
their role in the SEC's in-house adjudications. These parts provide
background for the remainder of the Article.
Part IV is the heart of the Article. In Subsection A, we first turn
to the question of whether SEC ALJs are inferior officers, because
resolution of the appointments and removal claims depends on a
finding that the SEC ALJs are inferior officers, not employees.
Although the SEC claims its ALJs are merely employees, we
disagree. The SEC ALJs are inferior officers. Because the SEC ALJs
are inferior officers, and because the SEC admits that its ALJs are not
appointed by its commissioners, the President, or a court of law, in
Subsection B, we explain why the SEC ALJ appointment process
violates the Constitution. Resolving this legal question is easy; fixing
the process is more difficult. Whether the SEC Commissioners can
retroactively appoint its current ALJs without casting doubt on
existing decisions and pending cases is unclear. Indeed, the recent
aftermath of NLRB v. Noel Canning suggests that these
administrative decisions may be invalid.36 In any event, whether this
type of post-hoc "appointment" truly comports in spirit with the
constitutional requirements of the Appointments Clause is
uncertain.37

Armageddon, 87 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1349 (2012) (suggesting courts adopt a three
tiered approach to for-cause removal provisions to preserve both agency
independence and the President's removal power).
3 Id. at 542-43 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("My research reflects that the Federal
Government relies on 1,584 ALJs to adjudicate administrative matters in over 25
agencies."); see also John F. Duffy, Are Administrative Patent Judges
Unconstitutional?, 77 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 904, 904-05 (2009) (concluding that
administrative patent judges are likely unconstitutional due to their method of
appointment).
36 See 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2553-56 (2014).
3
See generally Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Transcending Formalism and
Functionalism in Separation- of-Powers Analysis: Reframing the Appointments
Power after Noel Canning, 64 Duke L.J. 1513, 1516 (2015) (suggesting that a
workable account of the federal appointments process requires blending both a
formalist and functionalist legal analysis); John M. Greabe, Noel Canning and
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In Subsection C, we turn to the harder question: whether the
multiple for-cause removal provisions of the SEC ALJs violate
separation of powers. After exploring the conflicting and confusing
case law in this area, 38 we offer a framework for determining when
for-cause removal provisions violate separation of powers. We then
apply that framework to conclude that the multiple for-cause removal
provisions protecting the SEC ALJs likely violate separation of
powers. Specifically, the SEC ALJ's first level of for-cause removal
protection is problematic under Morrison v. 01sen. 39 And the SEC
ALJ's second level of for-cause removal protection is problematic
under Free Enterprise. Because the second level for-cause removal
provisions apply to most ALJs, 40 the implications are potentially
staggering. And, again, there does not appear to be an easy fix.
Possibly, the Supreme Court will refuse to extend its holding in
Free Enterprise-that multiple levels of tenure protection violate
separation of powers-to ALJs. 41 To extend the holding could
significantly disrupt the administrative state. However, if the Court
meant what it said in Free Enterprise, and if that case is to have any
relevance beyond the agency involved in it, then the multiple forcause removal provisions affecting the SEC ALJs specifically, and all
ALJs generally, will need to be reconsidered.

Remedial Obligation Under the Constitution, 100 Va. L.R. Online 47 (2014)
(arguing that the remedy for the wrong in Noel Canning should be decided in a
manner that is akin to harmless- and plain-error review).
38 Because most of the cases address the distinction between principal and
inferior officers and not inferior officers and employees, guidelines can be difficult
todiscern.
39 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
40 Whether Social Security ALJs are inferior officers is an open question given
the nature of their authority.
41 Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 477.
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SEC, ALJs, AND SEC ADJUDICATIONS

A. The Birth of the SEC
As a direct response to the Great Depression, Congress created
the SEC pursuant to Section 4 of the Exchange Act. 42 The Exchange
Act authorized the SEC to enforce the federal securities laws by
proposing securities rules and regulations and by regulating the
securities industry, which includes the nation's stock and options
exchanges. 43 According to its current website, the SEC's mission is
to "protect investors;" "maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets;"
and "facilitate capital formation."44 The SEC is an independent
agency 45 with five commissioners, all of whom the President
appoints, subject to Senate approval. 46 No more than three
commissioners can be members of the same political party. 47 The
Exchange Act does not expressly address the President's power to
remove the SEC commissioners. 48 Hence, it is unclear whether the
President has the power to remove them at will; however, many

15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (2012).
43 15 U.S.C. § 78d-1(a) (2012). The SEC also enforces the Securities Act of
42

1933, the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, the Investment Company Act of 1940, the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, and other
statutes.
44 The Role of the SEC, Investor.gov, http://investor.gov/introductioninvesting/basics/role-sec [https://perma.cc/S4UD-KB6H].
45 See Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 510-11 (noting that four Justices would
find the SEC to be an independent agency because it is a "free-standing, selfcontained entity in the Executive Branch") (internal quotation marks omitted); Kirti
Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and Executive
Agencies), 98 Cornell L. Rev. 769, 771 (2013) (noting that independent agencies
are generally "defined as entities whose heads enjoy (or are believed to enjoy) forcause removal protection," and they include the "Securities and Exchange

Commission (SEC)").
46 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a).
47 § 78d(a)
48 In contrast, the Federal Trade Commission Act gave the President the power
to remove Federal Trade Commission commissioners for "inefficiency, neglect of
duty, or malfeasance in office" (i.e., not "at will"). See 15U.S.C. § 41 (2012).
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assume that the President may remove the Commissioners only "for
cause."49
The SEC's powers have increased with time and need. For
example, in 1984, Congress granted the SEC the power to seek civil
monetary penalties in district court in insider trading cases.50 In 1990,
Congress, for the first time, authorized the SEC to pursue any person
for Exchange Act violations through an administrative cease-anddesist adjudication.51 Prior to 1990, such actions had to be brought in
federal district court. 52 Through this in-house adjudication, the SEC
enforcement division could obtain an order enjoining anyone found
to be violating the Exchange Act.5 3 Congress also gave the SEC
limited authority to seek civil monetary penalties in these
enforcement adjudications against regulated entities. 54 However, the
SEC's enforcement division had to file in federal district court to
seek monetary penalties against an entity who was either not a
regulated entity5 5 or was not associated with a regulated entity. 56 In
federal court, the defendants could invoke their Seventh Amendment
right to a jury trial, file pretrial motions, and seek discovery, 57
options that are unavailable in the SEC's in-house adjudications.5 8

49 The only time the Supreme Court has addressed this issue, the parties
stipulated that SEC Commissioners "cannot themselves be removed by the
President except [for] 'inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office"' Free
Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 487 (citing Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295

U.S. 602, 620 (1935)). The Court "decide[d] the case with that understanding."Id.
50 Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. Law No. 98-376, § 2, 98 Stat.
1264, 1264-65 (1984) (codified as amended in various sections of 15 U.S.C.).
51 Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990,

Pub. L. No. 101-429, §§ 102, 203, 104 Stat. 931, 933-35, 939-40 (1990).
52 See H.R. 975-Securities Law Enforcement Remedies Act, of 1990:
Summary Reported
to
House
amended
(07/23/1990),
Congress.gov,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/1 01 st-congress/house-bill/975
[https://perma.cc/2D2A-2YPP] (This bill was not enacted).

53 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3 (2012).
54 See Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act § 203.
55 Registered entities primarily include broker-dealers and investment advisers.

See id. §§ 301,401.
56 Id.
57

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12; Fed. R. Civ. P. 26; Fed. R. Civ. P. 38.
§§ 201.233-234 (2016).

58 See 17 C.F.R.
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Twenty years later, and in direct response to the financial crisis of
2009, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Act, which authorized the
SEC to seek civil monetary penalties from "any person" suspected of
violating the Exchange Act-both those registered and unregistered
with the SEC- after an administrative hearing, subject to judicial
review on the administrative record in the court of appeals. 59
Importantly, the Dodd-Frank Act gave the SEC the discretion to
decide whether to bring an enforcement action in federal court or in
an
administrative
proceeding.60 Because
respondents
in
administrative proceedings have no right to a jury trial, no right to
file pretrial motions, and little right to obtain discovery, the level
playing field tilted in the SEC's favor.
B. The Birth ofALJs
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 61 authorizes agencies,
including the SEC, to conduct formal, in-house administrative
proceedings, or adjudications, before an ALJ. 6 2 When the APA was
originally enacted, ALJs were called "hearing examiners" because
they were expected to oversee hearings and compile the record for
the agency to review de novo. 63 The name change is historically

5 Section 929P of the Dodd-Frank Act, amended Section 8A of the Securities
Act, Section 21B(a) of the Securities Exchange Act, Section 9(d)(1) of the
Investment Company Act, and Section 203(i)(1) of the Investment Advisers Act to
permit the imposition of civil monetary penalties in administrative proceedings, in
addition to the cease-and-desist orders previously available to the SEC. DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §

929P, 124 Stat.

1376, 1862-65 (2010). Additionally, for cease-and-desist

proceedings instituted under the Securities Act, where there was no pre-existing
provision for SEC-imposed penalties because that act did not address regulated
entities, the Dodd-Frank Act adopts the three-tiered penalty grid already contained
in the Securities Exchange Act, the Investment Company Act and the Investment
Advisers Act. Compare Dodd- Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act § 929P with Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act § §

202,301,401.
60 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(d), 78u-1, 78u-2, 78u-3 (2012).
61 5 U.S.C. § 551, et seq. (2012).
62 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (2012) (authorizing agencies to conduct hearings before
ALJs).
63 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2012).
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significant. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, "examiners" 64
presided over most agency proceedings. 65 Agencies hired examiners
directly. 6 6 These examiners were not independent, in the sense that
the agencies for which they worked controlled their assignments,
their compensation, their promotions, and their retention. 67 Indeed,
some examiners served completely at the pleasure of their superiors
and had no job security whatsoever. 68 Hence,
judicial
"independence" and "impartiality" were not an assured part of the
administrative equation. 69
By the 1930s, legal commentators began to raise serious concerns
about the status of these examiners, as well as about the examiners'
ability to decide cases fairly, independently, and impartially. 70 For
example, in 1934, the American Bar Association's (ABA) Special
Committee on Administrative Law criticized the fact that some

64 The term "examiners" came into use in 1906. 3 Kenneth Culp Davis,

Administrative Law Treatise § 17.11, at 313 (2d ed. 1978).
65 Russell L. Weaver, Management of ALJ Offices in Executive Departments

and Agencies, 47 Admin. L. Rev. 303, 303 (1995).
66 Id.

67 See Malcolm Rich, Adapting the Central Panel System: A Study of Seven
States, 65 Judicature 246, 246 (1981) ("The agencies controlled the compensation
and job tenure of their hearing officers and could ignore their decisions and enter
de novo rulings instead.").
68 See id.
69

See Ramspeck v. Fed. Trial Exam'rs Conference, 345 U.S. 128, 131 (1953)

(noting that hearing examiners were "mere tools of the agency concerned and
subservient to the agency heads in making their proposed findings of fact and
recommendations").
70 An ABA Report concluded that: [A]ppointments to administrative tribunals
are all too generally classed as patronage and, it is to be feared, the decisions of
some of them are occasionally dealt with as a form of patronage. It is not easy to
maintain judicial independence or high standards of judicial conduct when a
political sword of Damocles continually threatens the judge's source of livelihood.
While a few federal administrative tribunals have, in spite of all obstacles,
preserved a high degree of independence from political pressure and political
considerations, unfortunately there are others which have yielded and as a result the
cause of justice has suffered. Report of the Special Committee on Administrative

Law, 57 Annu. Rep. A.B.A. 539, 546 (1934) [hereinafter ABA Special Report]; see
also Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Federal Administrative Law Judges: A Focus on Our

Invisible Judiciary, 33 Admin. L. Rev. 109, 111 (1981).
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examiners exercised both prosecutorial and adjudicative functions. 71
However, separation of functions and status were not the only
concerns. Even had examiners been functionally separate from their
agencies, their decisions were not final and could be overruled by
agency superiors. 72
During the debate on enacting the APA, many suggestions were
offered regarding how to reform the system. Some argued that
Congress should create a federal administrative court that would hear
only administrative cases. 7 3 Others suggested that Congress should
create an independent administrative judiciary-a central panel of
ABA Special Report, sunra note 70, at 545. One member of the Committee
summed up the concerns as follows: If there is anything of which we can be
relatively sure after some hundreds, even thousands, of years of experience with
judicial machinery, it is that no man can be trusted to be judge in his own case. And
he is a judge in his own case if he is also the prosecutor or if he is also the legislator
who made the rule he is asked to interpret and apply. Agency after agency in our
federal government is authorized to wield all three powers of government at once.
Wearing its legislative toga, a commission makes a regulation, on compliance with
which John Doe's right to continue in business may depend. Having reason to
believe that John Doe is guilty of violating the regulation, the commission doffs the
toga and, taking up the executive scepter, investigates and prosecutes him. With the
scepter still in its hand, the commission hurriedly dons the judicial ermine and
proceeds to present itself at least two scintillas of evidence to prove that it was right
in the first place. While care is sometimes taken to preserve the form of placing the
burden of proof on the prosecutor, all the form in the world cannot disguise the fact
that the burden is usually on John Doe to prove himself innocent before a
commission that at least strongly suspects he is guilty. If John or his lawyer
construes the regulation differently than does the commission, that is just
unfortunate for John. The commission made the regulation and is confident that it
knows just what it meant to say. And it is always free to change its mind. John is in
the position of a man whose wife changes her system of bidding in the middle of a
bridge game without notice. He is sure to lose and is equally sure to get blamed for
it. Louis G. Caldwell, A Federal Administrative Court, 84 U. Pa. L. Rev. 966, 97374 (1936) (emphasis in original). See also Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S.
33, 36-38, 41-42 (1950).
72 Lubbers, sunra note 70, at 111 ("Furthermore, the role of the presiding
officer in an agency's decisional process was often unclear; many agencies would
ignore the officer's decisions without giving reasons, and enter their own de novo
decisions.").
73 John D. O'Reilly, Jr., The Federal Administrative Court Proposal: An
Examination of General Principles, 6 Fordham L. Rev. 365, 365-66 (1937); see
also Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure-Majority and
Minority Reports, 27 A.B.A. J. 91, 93 (1941).
71
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judges-to adjudicate administrative matters. 74 Congress ultimately
rejected both of these suggestions. 75
In 1946, with the passage of the APA, Congress opted for a third
approach, which included a number of protective components. First,
Congress sought to prevent agency officials from acting as lawmaker,
investigator, prosecutor, and jury in the same case. 76 To further this
point, the APA provided that ALJs could not be responsible to, or
subject to supervision by anyone performing investigative or
prosecutorial functions for an agency. 77 The APA, thus, required an
agency to separate its prosecuting functions from its adjudicating
functions. 78 Any agency employee who investigated or prosecuted a
case could not supervise or direct the work of those individuals who
adjudicated the same case. 79 Additionally, those individuals who
investigated or prosecuted a case could not be part of the decisionmaking process.80 And, the APA restricted some ex parte

74 See generally Rich, sunra note 67, 246-47 (describing these alternatives).
75 See generally 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. (2012).
76 5 U.S.C. § 554 (d)(2) (2012).
77 See § 554(d)(2). Indeed, Congress created a unique system because of its
concern about separating the adjudicatory function from other conflicting agency
functions. In 1970 and 1977 respectively, Congress created the Occupational Safety
and Health Review Commission (OSHRC) and the Federal Mine Safety and Health
Review Commission (FMSHRC). Robin J. Arzt, Recommendations for a new
Independent Adjudication Agency to Make the Final Administrative Adjudications
of Social Security Act Benefits Claims, 23 J. Nat'l Ass'n Admin. L. Judges 267,
281 (2003). Both are independent, Executive Branch agencies located outside the
Department of Labor. Id. Importantly, they have adjudicative authority only. Id.
("OSHRC determines whether regulations promulgated and enforced by the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration have been violated. FMSHRC
adjudicates violations of standards promulgated and enforced by the Mine Safety
and Health Administration.").
78 5 U.S.C. § 554(d).
79 § 554(d).
80 § 554(d). There were, however, some exceptions. The APA provides that
Section 554(d) "does not apply . .. to the agency or a member or members of the
body comprising the agency." § 554(d)(2)(C). As a result, "a member or members
of the body comprising the agency" could be involved in prosecutorial,
investigatory, and adjudicatory functions. § 554(d)(2)(c).
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communications. 8 1 In short, the APA altered the prior practice to
mirror more closely the federal judicial process.
In addition, the APA altered the prior treatment of examiners to
more closely mirror the status of Article III judges. The centerpiece
of the APA reform involved strengthening the job protections and
status of some of the examiners, 82 or as they would soon be called,
ALJs, 83 by giving these hearing examiners job protections designed
to bolster their independence. 84 So, the APA gave the role of hiring to
the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). 85 The OPM was

exclusively responsible for examining, certifying, and compensating
these hearing examiners. 86 The OPM determined the minimum
experience needed for an individual to be an ALJ and evaluated
applicants for the position (by conducting interviews, by
§ 554(d). Congress later amended the APA to add another section designed
to address ex parte communications. 5 U.S.C. § 557(d) (2012).
81

82 William S. Jordan, III, Chevron and Hearing rights: An Unintended

Combination, 61 Admin. L. Rev. 249 at 270 (2009) (citing Kenneth Culp Davis,
Administrative Law 309 (1951)); Attorney General's Committee on Administrative
Procedure, 77th Cong., Final Report on Administrative Procedure in Government
Agencies 45-46 (1941) (noting that the securing of fair and competent hearing
personnel was viewed as "the heart of formal administrative adjudication").
83 Marvin H. Morse, The Administrative Law Judge: A New Direction for the

Corps?, 30 Fed. B. News & J. 398, 401 n.2 (1983) ("The APA ...

initially referred

to presiding officers as examiners, colloquially referred to as hearing examiners.
This title was administratively standardized to Administrative Law Judge by the
Civil Service Commission in August 1972. The ALJ title was ratified by the Act of

March 27, 1978, Pub. [L. No.] 95-251, 92 Stat. 183."); see also Paul R. Verkuil et
al., The Federal Administrative Judiciary, 1992 A.C.U.S. 771, 798 (1992). In
1978, Congress amended the APA to officially change the term from hearing
examiners to administrative law judges. Pub. L. No. 95-251, 92 Stat. 183, 183-84

(1978).
84 See also Rich, sunra note 67, at 246 ("Congress, in its 1946 Administrative
Procedure Act (APA), sought to establish a corps of federal hearing officers that
were more independent of the agencies. Hearing officers were to be given career
appointments and compensation was to be managed by the Office of
Personnel Management. Yet, the hearing officers were not granted complete
independence from the agencies, for the APA allowed them to be assigned
exclusively to particular agencies.").
85 OPM has been "exclusively responsible for the initial examination,
certification for selection, and compensation of ALJs." Lubbers, sunra note 70, at

112.
86 Id.
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administering a test to evaluate writing ability, by evaluating the
experience of applicants, and by ranking eligible applicants). 87
Despite these changes, however, agencies retained control over the
ALJ they selected from the OPM's register and over the ALJ they
hired.88 In other words, while the agencies retained control over who
worked for them, the pool of available candidates, which the OPM
now controlled, shrunk.
Once hired, ALJs enjoyed increased job protections and
independence vis-a-vis pre-APA examiners. Although the APA did
not grant ALJs the life tenure granted to Article III judges, the APA
provided that ALJs could be removed only for cause or due to a
reduction in workforce. 89 In addition, the APA required that ALJs be
assigned cases in rotation and that ALJs not perform duties
inconsistent with their role as ALJs. 90 Additionally, the APA required
that ALJ compensation be determined based on length of service,
rather than based on performance evaluations. 91 As the Supreme
Court later concluded, these changes made a significant difference in
the status of ALJs:
There can be little doubt that the role of the modem federal
hearing examiner or administrative law judge within this framework
is "functionally comparable" to that of a judge. His powers are often,
if not generally, comparable to those of a trial judge: He may issue
subpoenas, rule on proffers of evidence, regulate the course of the
hearing, and make or recommend decisions. See § 556(c). More
importantly, the process of agency adjudication is currently
structured so as to assure that the hearing examiner exercises his
independent judgment on the evidence before him, free from
pressures by the parties or other officials within the agency. 92
As others have pointed out,9 3 the APA system is hardly perfect.
There are criticisms of the OPM's selection criteria and of agencies'

87 Id.

Id. at 113.
5 U.S.C. § 7521 (2012); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.131 (2007).
90 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (2012); 5 C.F.R. § 930.212 (2007).
91 See generally 5 U.S.C. § 5372 (2012); 5 U.S.C. § 4301(2)(D) (2012).
88

89

Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978).
93 See generally Michael Asimow & Jeffrey S. Lubbers, The Merits of
"Merits" Review: A Comparative Look at the Australian Administrative Appeals
92
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inability to conduct performance evaluations. 94 Indeed, ALJs are
removable "only" for "good cause," which must be "established and
determined" by the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) after a
formal adjudication.95 Members of the MSPB, who determine
whether "good cause" exists to remove an ALJ, are themselves
protected; the President may remove them "only for inefficiency,
neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office." 96 Hence, all ALJs are
protected by at least two dual for-cause layers.
C. SEC Adjudications
Like other federal agencies, the SEC is required to appoint and
compensate all of its officers, including ALJs. 97 The SEC selects
ALJs from the OPM's list of eligible candidates, based on the
agency's need. 98 More specifically, the SEC's Office of
Administrative Law Judges, with input from the Chief
Administrative Law Judge, human resources, and OPM, identifies

Tribunal, 28 Windsor Y. B. Access Just. 261 (2010) (discussing improvements to
the ALJ system).
94 See Verkuil, sunra note 83, at 1011 n.1199 (noting that the 1978 Civil
Service Reform Act "explicitly exempted ALJs from the performance appraisals
required under that system" to maintain "the present system of providing protection
for [ALJs]").
95 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (2012).
96 5 U.S.C. § 1202(d) (2012).
97 15 U.S.C. § 78d(b)(1) (2012).
98 See 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (2012); 5 C.F.R. § 930.204 (2014).
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and selects SEC ALJs. 99 The SEC Commissioners are not involved in
the appointment process in any way. 100
By statute, the SEC may delegate adjudicatory functions to its
ALJs. 101 Pursuant to that statutory authority, 102 the SEC, like many
agencies, has delegated significant authority to its ALJs to conduct
administrative proceedings. 103 Specifically, during these hearings,
ALJs may:
99 See Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and
Demand for Jury Trial ¶ 52, Gray Fin. Grp., Inc. v. SEC, 166 F. Supp. 3d 1335
(N.D. Ga. 2015) (No. 1:15-cv-0492-AT), 2015 WL 4185313 [hereinafter Gray
Complaint] ("SEC ALJs may be appointed by the SEC's Office of Administrative
Law Judges, with input from the Chief Administrative Law Judge, human resource
functions and the Office of Personnel Management."); see also 5 C.F.R §
930.204(a) ("An agency may appoint an individual to an administrative law judge
position only with prior approval of OPM, except when it makes its selection from
the list of eligibles provided by OPM. An administrative law judge receives a
career appointment and is exempt from the probationary period requirements under
part 315 of this chapter.").
100 A federal district judge enjoined the SEC from proceeding with an
enforcement hearing because the assigned ALJ was not appointed by the SEC
Commissioners. Hill v. SEC, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1303, 1319 (N.D. Ga. 2015)
(noting that "SEC ALJs are 'not appointed by the President, the Courts, or the
[SEC] Commissioners' and that "[t]he SEC concede[d] that Plaintiffs ALJ ...
was not appointed by an SEC Commissioner").
101 15 U.S.C. § 78d-1(a) (2012) ("[T]he [SEC] shall have the authority to
delegate, by published order or rule, any of its functions to a division of the
Commission ... including functions with respect to hearing, determining, ordering,
certifying, reporting, or otherwise acting as to any work, business, or matter.").
102 17 C.F.R § 200.14 (2016).
103 Under the SEC Rules of Practice, an SEC ALJ may, within his or her
discretion, perform the following actions: take testimony, 17 C.F.R § 201.111
(2016); conduct trials, id.; rule on admissibility of evidence, 17 C.F.R §§
201.111(c), 201.320 (2016); order production of evidence, 17 C.F.R §§
201.230(a)(2), 201.232 (2016); issue orders, including show-cause orders, see
e.g., 17 C.F.R 201.141(b) (2016); China Everhealth Corp., 109 S.E.C. Docket
2274, Release No. 1639 (July 22, 2014); rule on requests and motions, including
pre-trial motions for summary disposition, see. e.g., 17 C.F.R § 201.250(b)
(2016); grant extensions of time, 17 C.F.R. §201.161 (2016); dismiss for failure
to meet deadlines, 17 C.F.R § 201.155(a) (2016); reconsider decisions, 17
C.F.R § 201.111(h); reopen any hearing prior to the filing of a decision, 17 C.F.R.
§ 201.111(j); amend the SEC's OIP, 17 C.F.R. § 201.200(d)(2) (2016); impose
sanctions on parties for contemptuous conduct, 17 C.F.R. § 201.180(a) (2016);
reject filings that do not comply with the SEC's Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R §
201.180(b); dismiss the case, decide a particular matter against a party, or prohibit
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(1)Administer oaths and affirmations; (2) Issue
subpoenas; (3) Rule on offers of proof; (4) Examine
witnesses; (5) Regulate the course of a hearing; (6)
Hold pre-hearing conferences; (7) Rule upon motions;
and (8) Unless waived by the parties, prepare an initial
decision containing the conclusions as to the factual
introduction of evidence when a person fails to make a required filing or cure a
deficient filing, 17 C.F.R § 201.180(c); enter orders of default and rule on motions
to set aside default, 17 C.F.R § 201.155 (2016); consolidate proceedings, 17
C.F.R § 201.201(a) (2016); grant law enforcement agencies of the federal or state
government leave to participate, 17 C.F.R. § 201.210(c)(3) (2016); regulate
appearance of amici, 17 C.F.R. § 201.210(d); require amended answers to amended
OIPs, 17 C.F.R. § 201.220(b) (2016); direct that answers to OIPs need not
specifically admit or deny, or claim insufficient information to respond to, each
allegation in the OIP, 17 C.F.R § 201.220(c); require the SEC to file a more
definite statement of specified matters of fact or law to be considered or
determined, 17 C.F.R. § 201.220(d); grant or deny leave to amend an answer, 17
C.F.R § 201.220(e); direct the parties to meet for prehearing conferences and
preside over such conferences as the ALJ "deems appropriate," 17 C.F.R. §
201.221(b) (2016); order any party to furnish prehearing submissions, 17 C.F.R §
201.222(a) (2016); issue subpoenas, 17 C.F.R. § 201.232 (2016); rule on
applications to quash or modify subpoenas, 17 C.F.R § 201.232(e); order
depositions and act as the "deposition officer," 17 C.F.R. §§ 201.233, 201.234
(2016); regulate the SEC's use of investigatory subpoenas after the institution of
proceedings, 17 C.F.R § 201.230(g) (2016); modify the Rules of Practice with
regard to the SEC's document production obligations, 17 C.F.R. § 201.230(a)(1);
require the SEC to produce documents it has withheld, 17 C.F.R. § 201.230(c);
disqualify himself or herself from considering a particular matter, 17 C.F.R. §
201.112(a) (2016); order that scandalous or impertinent matter be stricken from any
brief or pleading, 17 C.F.R. § 201.152(f) (2016); order that hearings be stayed
while a motion is pending, 17 C.F.R § 201.154(a) (2016); stay proceedings
"pending Commission consideration of offers of settlement," 17 C.F.R. §
201.161(c)(2) (2016); modify the Rules of Practice as to participation of parties and
amici, 17 C.F.R § 201.210(f) (2016); allow the use of prior sworn statements for
any reason and limit or expand the parties' intended use of the same, 17 C.F.R §
201.235(a), (a)(5) (2016); express views on offers of settlement, 17 C.F.R §
201.240(c)(2) (2016); grant or deny leave to move for summary disposition, 17
C.F.R. § 201.250(a) (2016); order that hearings not be recorded or transcribed, 17
C.F.R. § 201.302(a) (2016); grant or deny the parties' proposed corrections to
hearing transcript, 17 C.F.R. § 201.302(c); issue protective orders governing
confidentiality of documents, 17 C.F.R § 201.322 (2016); take "official notice" of
facts not appearing in the record, 17 C.F.R § 201.323 (2016); regulate the scope
of cross-examination, 17 C.F.R § 201.326 (2016); and certify issues for
interlocutory review and determine whether proceedings should be stayed during
pendency of review, 17 C.F.R. § 201.400(c), (d) (2016).
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and legal issues presented, and issue an appropriate
order. 104
Although the APA requires that ALJs be assigned by rotation "so far
as is practicable,"' 0 5 SEC Rules provide that the Chief Administrative
Law Judge selects the ALJ for each hearing. 10 6 The selected ALJ then
presides over the hearing and issues an initial decision. 107
As noted earlier, procedures in SEC administrative proceedings
vary greatly from the procedures in federal court. 10 s For example,

104 17 C.F.R. § 200.14(a) (2016); see also 17 C.F.R § 200.30-9 (2016)
(authorizing ALJs to make initial decisions). These statutes are similar to the
authority in the APA. See 5 U.S.C. § 556(c)(2012).
105 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (2012).
106 17 C.F.R § 201.110 (2016).
107 17 C.F.R § 201.360(a)(1) (2016).
108 David Zaring, Enforcement Discretion at the SEC, 94 Tex. L. Rev. 1155,
1165-70 (2016) (discussing the ALJ process). Administrative proceedings in
general differ in several critical ways from federal court proceedings. In the case of
SEC proceedings, those differences include: (1) In administrative proceedings, an
SEC ALJ serves as finder of both fact and of law; (2) Administrative proceedings
do not afford juries to litigants, unlike federal court; (3) The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which apply in federal court, do not apply in an administrative
proceeding; (4) The Federal Rules of Evidence, together with their associated
protections, which apply in federal court, do not apply in an administrative
proceedings-any evidence that "can conceivably throw any light upon the
controversy," including unreliable hearsay testimony, "normally" will be admitted
in an administrative proceeding. In the Matter of Jay Alan Ochanpaugh, Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 54363, 2006 SEC LEXIS 1926, at *23 n.29 (Aug. 25,
2006); (5) Defendants' ability to conduct discovery is limited in administrative
proceedings. For example, pre-trial depositions are generally not allowed in
administrative proceedings; they are allowed in federal court (17 C.F.R. §§
201.233-201.234); (6) The SEC Rules of Practice do not provide respondents the
opportunity to challenge the SEC's legal theories before trial dispositive motions;
dispositive motions are available in federal court; (7) The SEC Rules of Practice do
not allow respondents to assert counterclaims against the SEC. Federal court
defendants may assert counterclaims against their adversaries; (8) The SEC Rules
of Practice require the hearing to take place, at most, approximately four months
from the issuance of the SEC's Order Instituting Proceedings (OIP). In its
discretion, the SEC can require the hearing to occur as early as one month after the
OIP is issued. While the SEC can allow itself years of investigation and research to
prepare an administrative case, the SEC does not need to start making available the
limited discovery afforded to administrative proceeding respondents until seven
days after the OIP is issued; and (9) Administrative proceedings are private, closed
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respondents have no right to a jury trial. 109 The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and Evidence do not apply; instead, the SEC uses its own
Rules of Practice. 110 Pursuant to these rules, respondents generally
cannot take depositions or obtain documents."' Counterclaims are
not permissible. 112 And the SEC's rules do not allow for the
equivalent of a Rule 12(b) motion to test the sufficiency of the SEC's
allegations. 11 3 Moreover, while the SEC may on its own motion, or at
the request of a party, order interlocutory review during a proceeding,
"[p]etitions by parties for interlocutory review are disfavored." 114
SEC administrative proceedings also occur, in theory at least,
much more quickly than federal court actions. Following an Order
Instituting Proceeding' s (OIP) issuance, a hearing must occur within
four months; however, the SEC may schedule the evidentiary hearing
as early as one month following the OIP's issuance.11 5 At the
conclusion of the hearing, the ALJ issues an initial decision. 116 Either
the litigant or the SEC's enforcement decision can appeal that
decision.1 1 7 If neither party appeals, 18 the ALJ's decision is "deemed
to the public and the news media, unlike federal court proceedings. As noted, many
of these differences apply in all administrative proceedings.
109 17 C.F.R. § 201.110 (2016).
110 17 C.F.R. § 201.100(a) (2016). Ochanpaugh, sunra note 108, at *24 n.29
("[Any] evidence that 'can conceivably throw any light upon the controversy,' at
hand should, normally be admitted.") (quoting Jesse Rosenblum, 47 S.E.C. 1065,
1072(1984)).
111 17 C.F.R. §§ 201.232-201.234 (2016). Recently, on July 13, the SEC
amended its Rule of Practice governing administrative proceedings. The most
significant amendments are that the length of the prehearing period is extended and
parties now have the right to limited discovery-type depositions in complex cases.
Daniel V. Ward, Jon A. Daniels, & Alexandria Perrin, Inside SEC's New In-House
Court
Rules,
Law360
(Aug.
1,
2016,
11:54
AM),
http://www.1aw360.com/articles/823479/inside-sec-s-new-in-house-court-rules
[https://perma.cc/G6J6-XPBA]. The rules take effect for all cases filed after
September 27,2016.
112 See generally 17 C.F.R. §§ 201.100-201.250 (2016) (Rules of Practice).
113 § 201.220 (describing content of answers to allegations).
114 § 201.400(a).
115 § 201.360(a)(2).
116 § 201.360(a)(2).
117 § 201.410. In addition, the SEC can review the matter "on its own
initiative." § 201.411(c).
118 And the SEC does not review an initial order.
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the action of the Commission,"1 19 and the SEC issues an order
making the AL's initial order final. 120
If either party appeals, the SEC's review is essentially de novo. 121
If a majority of the participating Commissioners do not agree with
the AL's initial decision, the AL's initial decision "shall be of no
effect, and an order will be issued in accordance with this result." 122
If, instead, a majority agree with the ALJ, the SEC will adopt the
AL's initial order as its final order.123 An appealed ALJ decision is
not final until the SEC adopts it as final. 124
If a respondent loses before the SEC, the respondent may petition
the appropriate federal court of appeals to review the SEC's final
order.125 Once an appeal is filed, the court of appeals has "exclusive"
jurisdiction "to affirm or modify and enforce or to set aside the order
in whole or in part." 126 For judicial review, the SEC's findings of
facts are "conclusive" "if supported by substantial evidence." 127

15 U.S.C. § 78d-1(c) (2012).
17 C.F.R. § 201.360(d)(2) (2016).
§§ 201.411(a), 201.452. Additionally, the Commissioners can allow the
parties to submit additional evidence. Id. While review is de novo, the SEC accepts
the AL's "credibility finding, absent overwhelming evidence to the contrary." In
re Clawson, Exchange Act Release No. 48143, 2003 WL 21539920, at *2 (July 9,
2003); see also In re Pelosi, Securities Act Release No. 3805, 2014 WL 1247415, at
*2 (Mar. 27, 2014) ("The Commission gives considerable weight to the credibility
determination of a law judge since it is based on hearing the witnesses' testimony
and observing their demeanor. Such determinations can be overcome only where
the record contains substantial evidence for doing so.") (footnote and internal
quotation marks omitted).
122 17 C.F.R. § 201.411(f) (2016).
123 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2012).
124 § 557(b).
125 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a)(1) (2012).
126 § 78y(a)(3).
127 § 78y(a)(4). The court of appeals may also order additional evidence to be
taken before the SEC and remand the action for the SEC to conduct an additional
hearing with the new evidence. § 78y(a)(5). The SEC then files its new findings of
facts based on the additional evidence with the court of appeals which will be taken
as conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. Id.
119
120
121
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III. THE CONTROVERSY
Respondents raise two claims under Article II of the U.S.
Constitution: (1) the SEC ALJs' appointment violates the
Appointments Clause because the ALJs are not appointed by the
President, a court of law, or a department head; and (2) the SEC
ALJs' multiple for-cause tenure protection violates Article II and
separation of powers 128 because the President is not able to faithfully
exercise the laws and remove incompetent executive officials. Both
of these claims require a court to first find that the SEC ALJs are
officers, not employees. 129 If the SEC ALJs are merely employees,
neither their appointment nor their removal violates the Constitution.
A. Inferior Officers
The Appointments Clause of the U.S. Constitution identifies the
appointment procedure for two types of officers: principal officers,
who are selected by the President with the advice and consent of the
Senate, and inferior officers, whom "Congress may allow to be
appointed by the President alone, by the heads of departments, or by
the Judiciary." 130 No one argues that the ALJs are principal
officers; 131 rather, the dispute is whether the SEC ALJs are inferior
officers or employees. 132

128 Separation of powers is implied by "the opening sections of Articles I, II,
and III of the Constitution, [which] separately and respectively vest 'all legislative
Power' in Congress, the 'executive Power' in the President, and the 'judicial
Power' in the Supreme Court (and such 'inferior Courts as Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish'). In doing so, these provisions imply a structural
separation-of-powers principle." Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting

Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 515 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Miller v.
French, 530 U.S. 327, 341-342 (2000)).
129 See. e.g., Gray Fin. Grp., Inc. v. SEC, 166 F. Supp. 3d 1335 (N.D. Ga.
2015); Hill v. SEC, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1297 (N.D. Ga. 2015).
130 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 132 (1976); U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
131 See Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 664 (1997) (holding that
military appellate judges are inferior officers, not principal officers).
132

Hill, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 1316 (noting that "[t]he issue of whether the SEC

ALJ is an inferior officer or employee for purposes of the Appointments Clause
depends on the authority he has in ("Whether administrative law judges are
necessarily 'Officers of the United States' is disputed.").
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1. The Supreme Court's Appointment Cases 13 3
While there is no bright-line rule dividing principal and inferior
officers, 134 the difference between an officer and a non-officer
employee depends on whether the employee exercises significant
authority pursuant to the laws of the United States. 135 Initially, the
Supreme Court divided government employees into two categories:
principal officers and inferior officers. 136 The Supreme Court now
recognizes a third category: lesser functionaries, or employees. 137
Employees do not exercise significant authority; officers do. 138 When
determining whether individuals exercise significant authority
pursuant to the laws of the United States, courts consider a variety of
factors, including the manner in which Congress created the position,
the appointment process, the responsibilities of the position, the
tenure and duration of the position, the amount and manner of pay,
the level of supervision, and the identity of the supervisor. 139 No one
factor is determinative. 140
133 The Supreme Court case law in this area focuses on the difference between
principal and inferior officers, rather than the difference between inferior officers
and officers. This point makes the analysis difficult.
134 See Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury, Acting Assistant Attorney
General, Office of Legal Counsel, to the General Counsels of the Executive
Branch: Officers of the United States Within the Meaning of the Appointments
Clause3(Apr. 16,2007),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/2007/04/3 1/appointmentscl
ausev10.pdf [https://perma.cc/7RPQ-L463]("[T]he Supreme Court has not
articulated the precise scope and application of the [Inferior Officer] Clause's
requirements."); Eric J. Konecke, The Appointments Clause and Military Judges:
Inferior Appointment to a Principal Office, 5 Seton Hall Const. L.J. 489, 492
(1995); John M. Burkoff, Appointment and Removal Under the Federal
Constitution: The Impact of Buckley v. Valeo, 22 Wayne L. Rev. 1335, 1347-64
(1976) (describing Supreme Court precedent as "circular" and "not particularly
useful").
135 Edmond, 520 U.S. at 662 (noting that exercising "significant authority" on
behalf of the United States is "the line between [an] officer and non-officer").
136 Ex parte Hennen, 38 U.S. 230, 235 (1839) (holding that a law clerk was an
inferior officer).
137 Freytag v. Comm'r, 501 U.S. 868, 881 (1991).
138 Id. at 881 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 n.162 (1976)).
139 Id. at 880-82; see also Moses Tincher, Note, Timber! The SEC Falls Hard
as the Georgia District Court in Timbervest v. SEC Finds the Appointment of the
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Three cases are particularly illustrative. Two consider the status
of hearing officers similar to the SEC ALJs; however, the cases
reached opposite and inconsistent results. 141 The third directly
addressed SEC ALJs. 142 First is the Supreme Court's 1991 decision
in Frevtag v. Commissioner. 143 Second is the D.C. Circuit Court's
2000 decision in Landry v. FDIC. 144 Third is the D.C. Circuit Court's
decision in Raymond J. Lucia Co., Inc. v. SEC. 145
Freytag was decided first and is, arguably, the most important
case because it came from the Supreme Court. 146 In that case, the
Supreme Court determined that Tax Court special trial judges (STJ)
were inferior officers. 147 The Tax Court is an Article I court with
judges who are appointed for limited terms. 148 Congress authorized
the Chief Judge of the Tax Court to appoint STJs to hear specific tax
cases. 149 For some of these cases the STJ could resolve the case
directly, but for other cases, the STJ could only make recommended
decisions.15 0 In the latter situation, a judge from the Tax Court would
review the STJ's recommended decision and make a final decision. 151
Freytag's case was one of the latter, requiring review and adoption by
a Tax Court judge. 152
Freytag challenged the validity of the judgment against him,
arguing that the appointment of the STJs by the chief judge of the
Tax Court violated the U.S. Federal Constitution's Appointments

SEC ALJs "Likely Unconstitutional" 67 Mercer L. Rev. 459, 468-70 (2016)
(noting that courts use the four-factors test in Morrison, as well as the level of
supervision test in Edmond, to determine whether an officer exercises significant
authority).
140 Freytag, 501 U.S. at 880-82.
141 See id. at 868; Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
142 Raymond J. Lucia Co., Inc. v. SEC, 832 F.3d 277, 296 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
143 Freytag, 501 U.S. at 868-922.
144
145

204 F.3d at 1134.

832 F.3d at 296 (reh'g granted Feb. 16, 2017).
501 U.S. at 868.
147 Id. at 881-82.
148 Id. at 871.
149 Id. at 870.
150 Id. at 873.
151 Id.
152 Freytag, 501 U.S. at 872.
146
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Clause.15 3 The government responded by arguing that the STJs were
merely employees who did "no more than assist the regular Tax
Court judge in taking the evidence and preparing proposed findings
and opinion." 154 The Justices unanimously rejected this argument and
held that the STJs were inferior officers.155 To hold that the STJs
were inferior officers and not merely employees, the Court
considered several factors. First, the Court noted that "the office of
a special trial judge is 'established by Law"' 156 and that the statute
lays out the "duties, salary, and means of appointment for that
office." 157 The Court noted that "[t]hese characteristics distinguish
special trial judges from special masters, who are hired by Article III
courts on a temporary, episodic basis, whose positions are not
established by law, and whose duties and functions are not delineated
in a statute." 158 In other words, STJs serve more permanently.
Second, the Court focused on the types of duties and level of
discretion the STJs had. The STJs "perform more than ministerial
tasks. They take testimony, conduct trials, rule on the admissibility of
evidence, and have the power to enforce compliance with discovery
orders." 159 In the course of performing these tasks, the STJs "exercise
significant discretion." 160
Third, the Court added that "[e]ven if the duties of [STJs] were
not as significant as we . . . have found them to be," there are

circumstances where they "exercise independent authority," and they
Id. at 872.
Id. at 880.
155 The Justices sharply disagreed as to why the appointment process was
valid. See id. Five justices reasoned that the STJ was an "inferior Officer" whose
appointment was proper because the Tax Court could properly appoint an inferior
officer as one of "the Courts of Law" under Article II, Section 2, Clause 2. Id. at
890-92. The remaining four justices reasoned that the STJ was an "inferior
Officer," but that the Tax Court's power to make such appoints derived from the
fact that it was a Department within the meaning of Article II, Section 2, Clause 2.
Id. at 892-93 (Scalia, J., concurring).
156 Id. at 881 (citing Burnap v. United States, 252 U.S. 512, 516-17 (1920));
United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 511-12 (1879)).
157 Id. at 880-82 (citing BurnaD, 252 U.S. at 516-17; Germaine, 99 U.S. at
511-512.).
158 Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881.
159 Id. at 881-82.
160 Id. at 882.
153

154
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cannot be "inferior officers" for some purposes and not others. 161
Fourth, and almost as an aside, the Court pointed out that the STJs
were authorized to decide cases in some instances, even if in other
instances the STJs only proposed findings and orders, while the
regular Tax Court judge rendered the final decision. 162 Notably, the
Court specifically rejected the argument that officials who "lack
authority to enter into a final decision" must be employees and not
inferior officers, because that argument "ignores the significance of
the duties and discretion that special trial judges possess." 163 In sum,
the Court held that the STJs could not be inferior officers in some
situations and employees in others, finding that the STJs' limited,
final decision-making authority was not determinative. 164
Despite this relatively clear finding, the D.C. Circuit Court in
Landry v. FDIC focused on this factor to distinguish Freytag's
holding from the case that came before that court. 165 In Landry, the
D.C. Circuit Court held that Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC) ALJs were employees and not inferior officers. 166 The
plaintiff in Lan
challenged the constitutionality of the FDIC ALJ
appointment process. 167 Landry argued that the FDIC ALJ was an
inferior officer who could only be appointed by the President, the
courts, or the head of a department pursuant to the Appointments
Clause. 168 The FDIC ALJ had been appointed by a federal banking
agency. 169
In resolving the inferior officer issue, the court noted that "[t]he
line between 'mere' employees and inferior officers is anything but
bright . . . . In fact, the earliest Appointments Clause cases often
161

Id.

162
163

Id.
Id. at 881.

164
165

Freytag, 501 U.S. at 882.

Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1125-44 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
Id. at 1134.
167 Id. at 1130.
168 "[The President] ... shall appoint ...
Officers of the United States, whose
Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established
by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior
Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the
Heads of Departments." U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
169
Landrv, 204. F.3d at 1130.
166
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employed circular logic, granting officer status to an official based in
part upon his appointment by the head of a department." 170 Next, the
court examined and distinguished Frevtag, claiming, erroneously,
that the Court in that case had "laid exceptional stress on the STJs'
final decision[-]making power." 171 The Lan
majority noted that
the STJs had "authority to render the final decision of the Tax Court
in declaratory judgment proceedings and in certain small-amount tax
cases." 172 The majority contrasted the FDIC ALJs' decision- making
authority with that of the STJs, noting that the FDIC ALJs issue
recommended, not initial, decisions. 173 The FDIC Board of Directors
then renders a final decision based on a de novo review of the entire
record. 174 Because the FDIC ALJs could only issue recommended
decisions, and because final decisions were reserved to the FDIC, the
majority held that the FDIC ALJs were employees, not officers. 175
Judge Randolph concurred in the result, but strongly criticized the
majority's finding that the FDIC ALJs were not inferior officers. 176
He reasoned that the FDIC ALJs were indistinguishable from the
STJs based on the reasoning provided in Freytag. 177 Quoting Freva
extensively, Judge Randolph noted that the Supreme Court had
placed no particular emphasis on the fact that the STJs had final
decision-making authority. 178 Indeed, "the fact that an ALJ cannot
render a final decision and is subject to the ultimate supervision of
the FDIC shows only that the ALJ shares the common characteristic
Id. at 1132 (citations omitted).
Id. at 1134.
172 Id. at 1133 (citing Freytag, 501 U.S. at 882) (emphasis in original).
173 Id. (citing 12 C.F.R. § 308.38).
174 Id. (citing 12 C.F.R. § 308.40).
175 Landry, 204. F.3d at 1133.
176 Id. at 1140 (Randolph, J., concurring).
177 Id. at 1140-41 (finding that Frevtag "cannot be distinguished" because
"[t]here are no relevant differences between the ALJ in this case and the [STJ] in
Freytag") (emphasis in original).
178 Id. at 1142 (noting that the majority's "first distinction of Frevag is thus no
distinction at all") (emphasis in original). The Supreme Court stated that Tax Court
Rule 183, which established the deferential standard, was "not relevant to [its]
grant of certiorari," and noted that it would say no more about the rule than to say
that the STJ did not have final authority to decide Petitioner's case. Freytag v.
Comm'r, 501 U.S. 868, 874 n.3 (1991); see also Landry, 204 F.3d at 1142
(Randolph, J., concurring).
170
171
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of the 'inferior Officer,' [because] 'inferior officers' are officers
whose work is directed and supervised at some level by others who
were appointed by Presidential nomination." 17 9 Judge Randolph also
pointed out that the decisive fact for the majority in Landry-that the
FDIC ALJs lack authority to enter final orders-was based on an
"alternative holding" from Freytag; the Supreme Court had already
determined the STJs were inferior officers before it provided the
final-order-authority analysis.18 0
In short, Land's holding that the FDIC ALJs were not officers
is inconsistent with Frevtag and other cases addressing this issue. 181
The Lan
majority acknowledged that the FDIC ALJs, like the
STJs, were established by law; that their "duties, salary, and means of
appointment" were specified by statute; and that they conduct trials,
take testimony, rule on evidence admissibility, and enforce discovery
compliance. 182 Even though the Supreme Court in Frevtag found that
the STJs' exercise of these powers constituted the exercise of
"significant authority," the Landr majority concluded the FDIC
ALJs' exercise of these powers was less important than whether the
ALJs had the authority to render a final decision. 183 Despite
recognizing that the Supreme Court had "introduced mention of the
STJs' power to render final decisions with something of a shrug," the
D.C. Circuit held that FDIC ALJs were not inferior officers solely

Landry, 204. F.3d at 1142 (quoting Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651,
663 (1997)).
180 Id. Despite finding that FDIC ALJs are inferior officers, Judge Randolph
179

also noted there was no violation of the Appointments Clause because (1) the FDIC
ALJs were properly appointed by the Office of Thrift Supervision-which may
constitute the "head of department" under Article II, and (2) because of the FDIC's
de novo review process, the plaintiff had suffered no prejudice. Id. at 1143.
181

See, e.g., Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 665-66 (1997)

(examining a number of factors to hold that judges of Coast Guard Court of
Criminal Appeals were inferior officers); Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177,
187-88 (1995) (examining a number of factors to hold that appellate military
judges from the Coast Guard Court of Military Review were inferior officers
subject to the appointmentprovisions).
182
Landry, 204 F.3d at 1133-34 (internal quotations omitted).
183

Id. at 1133.
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because they did not have the power to render final decisions in
certain cases. 184
More recently, the D.C. Circuit compounded its error and gave
employer-agencies the power to determine whether its ALJ were
employees or inferior officers. In Raymond J. Lucia Co., Inc. v.
SEC, 185 -the first of these SEC cases to reach the courts-the D.C.
Circuit identified the "main criteria for drawing the line between
inferior Officers and employees .

.

. [as] (1) the significance of the

matters resolved by the officials, (2) the discretion they exercise in
reaching their decisions, and (3) the finality of those decisions." 186
The court repeated that the FDIC ALJs in Landry were not inferior
officers because they did not meet the third criterion. 187 The court
then reasoned that its holding in Landry required it to hold that the
SEC ALJs are employees because they too, it concluded, cannot issue
final decisions.188 This holding is incorrect because, as shown above,
this reasoning is inconsistent with Frevtag; yet, the court suggested
that it was bound to follow its precedent regardless of whether
Landv and Frevtag were consistent. 189
However, even if the court is correct that the finality of the
decision-making authority is the only relevant criterion, this decision
is wrong for another reason. As the petitioners argued, the relevant
statute specifically provides that an SEC AL's decision "shall, for
all purposes, including appeal or review thereof, be deemed the
action of the Commission." 1 90 Thus, the statutory language provides
that the SEC ALJs have statutory authority to make final decisions.

Id. at 1134; cf Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd.,
684 F.3d 1332, 1339 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (reasoning that the Copyright Royalty
Board's "nonremovability and the finality of its decision[-making] made the
officers inferior officers").
185 See generally 832 F.3d 277, 277 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (reh'g granted Feb. 16,
2017).
186 Id. at 284 (quoting Tucker v. Comm'r, 676 F.3d 1129, 1132 (D.C. Cir.
2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).
18 7 Id.
184

188

Id. at 285.

Id. (arguing that "to the extent petitioners contend that the approach
required by Landry is inconsistent with Freytag or other Supreme Court precedent,
this court has rejected that argument and Landry is the law of the circuit").
190 15 U.S.C. § 78d-1(c) (2012).
189
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In other words, Congress authorized the SEC ALJs to have final
decision-making authority, and it is congressional intent regarding
the status of these officers that is relevant.
In Raymond J. Lucia Co., Inc., the government acknowledged
that the statute authorized the SEC ALJs to make final decisions;
however, the government countered that the SEC, by rule, chose not
to give ALJs this finality decision-making power. 191 The D.C. Circuit
adopted this argument noting that, first, the SEC's rules provide that
the SEC can take additional time to decide whether it will review an
ALJ decision, even when no one requests such review. 192 Second, the
SEC's rules provide that when deciding not to order review, the
Commission will issue an order indicating that it has decided not to
review the AL's decision and set a date when any sanctions will take
effect. 193 Yet, it is unclear how either of these actions alone, or
combined, robs the AL's decision of finality. Regardless, even if
they did, these are the SEC's rules, not congressional statutes. 194 The
SEC simply has no power to turn an inferior officer into an employee
by issuing a procedural rule or two. 195 The decision of whether an
officer is a principal officer, an inferior officer, or an employee was
constitutionally left to Congress, not the agency employing that
officer. 196 The D.C. Circuit flipped the power.
In sum, the D.C. Circuit in both Lan
and Raymond J. Lucia
Co., Inc. misapplied Frevtag by concluding that final decisionmaking authority was the sole criterion for distinguishing between an
inferior officer and an employee. 197 The court's holding in both cases
is not consistent with F
. Moreover, the D.C. Circuit
compounded its erroneous reasoning. Even if the court were correct
that final decision-making authority alone were the deciding factor,
832 F.3d at 285-86.
Id. at 286 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 201.411(c)).
Id. (citing 17 C.F.R. § 201.360(d)(2)).
194 See generally 17 C.F.R. §201.100.
195 Cf. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'n, 531 U.S. 457, 486 (2001) (rejecting
the lower court's holding that an agency could cure a delegation issue by narrowly
interpreting its governing statute).
196 See U.S. Const. art. 2, § 2, cl. 2.
197 See Raymond J. Lucia Co., Inc. v. SEC, 832 F.3d 227, 284-85 (reh'g
granted Feb. 16, 2017) (citing Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1134-35 (D.C. Cir.
2000); Freytag v. Comm'r, 501 U.S. 868, 881 (1991).
191

192
193
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Congress gave such authority to the SEC ALJs. 198 It is immaterial
that the SEC may have tried to cabin that authority by issuing
procedural rules; the SEC simply has no power to determine what
type of officer it hires. In short, these decisions should not control the
outcome of whether the SEC ALJs are inferior officers.
In late 2016, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit decided Bandimere v. SEC. 199 Bandimere involved an appeal
from an SEC administrative enforcement proceeding presided over
by an SEC AL. The plaintiff in the case had argued in the
underlying enforcement proceeding that the SEC ALJ was an inferior
officer and unconstitutionally appointed; however, the SEC rejected
that argument. 200 The SEC conceded that if the SEC ALJ were an
inferior officer, he would be unconstitutionally appointed. 201
However, the SEC argued that its SEC ALJs are merely employees,
not inferior officers. 202
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit disagreed with the SEC and held
that because the SEC ALJ was an inferior officer who was not
appointed as the Constitution required, he "held his office
unconstitutionally when he presided over Mr. Bandimere's
hearing." 203 In its reasoning, the majority explained that "[a]lthough
the Supreme Court has not stated a specific test for determining
whether an employee has inferior officer status, '[e]fforts to define
['inferior Officers'] inevitably conclude that the term's sweep is
unusually broad."'

204

Importantly, the majority noted that the Supreme Court's opinion
in Frevtag v. Commissioner 205 controlled the result in Bandimere. 206
In Frevtag a unanimous Court had held that the Tax Court's special
trial judges (STJs) were inferior officers and not employees. 207 As
See 15 U.S.C. § 78d-1(c).
199 --- F.3d --- , No. 15-9586, 2016 WL 7439007 (10th Cir. Dec. 27, 2016).
200 Id. at *2.
201 Id. at *3 (citing SEC Release No. 9972, 2015 WL 6575665, at * 19).
202 See id. at *10.
203 Id. at *15.
204 Id., at *4 (quoting Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. 477, 539 (2010) (Breyer,
J., dissenting)).
205 501 U.S. 868 (1991).
2 06
Bandimere, 2016 WL 7439007, at *4.
207 Id., at *4-6; Frevtag v. Comm'r, 501 U.S. 868 (1991).
198
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noted above, the Court identified three factors for courts to consider
when determining whether an employee is an inferior officer: First,
whether the position was "established by law;" second, whether "the
duties, salary, and means of appointment for that office are specified
by statute"; and third, and most importantly, whether the employee
exercises significant duties and discretion. 208 Applying those factors
to the SEC ALJs, the Bandimere majority concluded that SEC ALJs
were inferior officers because the position was established by the
Administrative Procedures Act, statutes set forth the SEC ALJs'
duties, salaries, and hiring process, and the "SEC ALJs exercise
significant discretion in performing 'important functions'
commensurate with the STJs' functions described in Freva." 209 The
majority concluded:
In sum SEC ALJs closely resemble the STJs described in
Freytag. Both occupy offices established by law; both have duties,
salaries, and means of appointment specified by statute; and both
exercise significant discretion while performing "important
functions" that are "more than ministerial tasks." Further, both
perform similar adjudicative functions as set out above. We therefore
hold that the SEC ALJs are inferior officers who must be appointed
in conformity with the Appointments Clause. 210
The majority then explicitly rejected the SEC's argument that
Freytag had relied on the STJs' "final decision-making power" to
decide STJs were inferior officers. 211 In doing so, the majority
criticized the D.C. Circuit's decision in Landry v. FDIC 212 upon
which the SEC had relied. The majority noted that the majority

Id. at *5 (citing Frevtag, 501 U.S. at 881).
Id. at *8-9 (noting that the SEC ALJs' exercise of authority included
making credibility findings to which the SEC gives "considerable weight;"
"shap[ing] the administrative record by taking testimony;" ruling on discovery,
admissibility of evidence and dispositive motions; entering default judgments; and
issuing initial decisions that publicly "declare respondents liable and impose
sanctions").
210 Id. at *9 (citing Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881-82; Samuels, Kramer & Co. v.
Comm'r, 930 F.2d 975, 986 (2d Cir. 1991)).
211 Id. at *10.
208

209

2 2

1

Id.
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opinion in Landry misinterpreted Freytag by placing undue weight on
final decision-making authority of the STJs. 213
In contrast, the Bandimere dissent argued that the SEC ALJs'
lack of "final decision-making authority," should be determinative.
The dissent expressed concern about "the probable consequences" of
the majority's holding, in that "all federal ALJs are at risk of being
declared inferior officers."2 1 4
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Bandimere has caused a circuit
split, with the decision from the three-judge panel of the D.C. Circuit
in Raymond J. Lucia Co., Inc. v. SEC. 2 1 5 In that case, the D.C.
Circuit applied Land, rather than Frevtag, to hold that because the
SEC ALJs do not have final decision making authority, they are
employees. 216
The circuit split may not last long. The D.C. Circuit recently
granted the petitioner's petition for rehearing en banc in Raymond J.
Lucia Co., Inc. v. SEC. 2 17 The parties have been directed to brief two
issues: (1) whether the SEC administrative law judge who handled
the hearing is an inferior officer rather than an employee, and (2)
whether the court should overrule Land . 2 18 Moreover, on the same
date it granted en banc review in Raymond J. Lucia Co., Inc., the
D.C. Circuit also granted en banc review in the case of PHH Corp. v.
CFPB. 219 In PHH Cor., the
D.C. Circuit had held that an independent agency with a single
director head violates Article II of the Constitution. 220 Importantly,
one issue to be briefed is what the court should do if it decides in
Raymond J. Lucia Co., Inc. that ALJs are inferior officers. 221
It thus appears likely that the D.C. Circuit will reverse Raymond
J. Lucia Co., Inc. and hold that the SEC ALJs are inferior officers.
Assuming that the court does so, the SEC will have to reappoint its

216

Id.
Id. at *25 (McKay, C.J., dissenting).
832 F.3d 277, 283 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (reh'g granted Feb. 16,2017).
Id. at 283-89.

217

Id.

218

Order docketed, No. 15-1345 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 16, 2017).
839 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (reh'g granted Feb. 16,2017).
Id. at *9.
Order docketed, No. 15-1345 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 16, 2017).

213
214
215

219
220
221
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ALJs, this time constitutionally. But two questions remain. First, are
the multiple for-cause removal restrictions constitutional, and second,
how can the SEC fix the "thousands of [invalid] administrative
actions" its unconstitutional ALJs have issued. 222
Less directly analogous, but still relevant, are the Supreme Court
decisions in the military tribunal cases. The Supreme Court issued
three opinions, following Frevtag but preceding Landry, addressing
the Appointments Clause as it relates to judges presiding in military
tribunals. 223 The holdings in these cases suggest that officials (other
than Article III judges) who preside over government adjudications
are inferior officers of the United States.
First, in Weiss v. United States, the plaintiff challenged the
appointment of military trial judges who were appointed by the
President to be military officers, but who were never appointed to be
military trial judges. 224 The Court unanimously held that because the
initial appointment of those officers serving as judges was consistent
with the Appointments Clause, no reappointment was required.225
This case did not examine the inferior officer distinction, but merely
assumed that the military judges were inferior officers. 226
Second, in Ryder v. United States, the plaintiff challenged his
criminal conviction because the intermediate appellate court (named
at that time the Coast Guard Court of Military Review) included two
civilian judges whose appointments did not comply with the
Appointments Clause. 227 Unlike the trial judges in Weiss, these
Id., at *25 (McKay, C.J., dissenting).
Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 651 (1997); Ryder v. United
States, 515 U.S. 177, 177 (1995); Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 163 (1994).
224 Weiss, 510 U.S. at 170. The parties apparently stipulated that "military
judges, because of the authority and responsibilities they possess, act as 'Officers'
of the United States." Id. at 169, 173 (stating prior cases "undoubtedly establish the
analytical framework upon which to base the conclusion that a military judge is an
'officer of the United States'-a proposition to which both parties agree").
225 Id. at 176. The justices disputed the issue of whether the military judges
were "inferior Officers" or "principal officers," not whether they were employees.
See id. at 182-94 (Souter, J., concurring).
226 Because both parties did not dispute whether military trial judges were
officers, the Court simply assumed they were and focused on "whether these
officers needed another appointment pursuant to the Appointments Clause before
assuming their judicial duties." Id. at 170.
227 Ryder, 515 U.S. at 179.
222
223
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judges were not first appointed as military officers; hence, they were
never appointed to a military office in a manner that was consistent
with the Appointments Clause. 228 Without further explanation, the
Court seemingly agreed with the determination of the Court of
Military Appeals that the judges serving on the Coast Guard Court of
Military Review were inferior officers who needed to be appointed in
accordance with the Appointments Clause. 229 Significantly, the Court
made this presumption while disregarding the de facto officer
doctrine 230 as well as the fact that the decisions of the appellate
judges in question were subject to review by a higher appellate
court. 23 1

Following the Weiss decision, the Secretary of Transportation
corrected the appointments infirmity by "adopting" the civilian
judges as his own "judicial appointments." 232 A few years later, this
retroactive adoption-appointment was challenged in Edmond v.
United States. 233 In Edmond, the issue was whether military trial
judges were principal or inferior officers. 234 The Court concluded
these judges were "inferior officers," because "[g]enerally speaking,
the term 'inferior officer' connotes a relationship with some higher
ranking officer or officers below the President: Whether one is an
'inferior' officer depends on whether he has a superior." 235 Notably,
the fact that the military judges' decisions were subject to reversal on
further appeal demonstrated that these judges "have no power to
render a final decision on behalf of the United States unless permitted
to do so by other Executive officers," thus making them inferior

Id. at 187-88.
See id. at 180 (noting that the Court of Military Appeals had relied on its
holding in U.S. v. Carpenter, 37 M.J. 291, that military judges are inferior officers).
230 The de facto officer doctrine is a doctrine that allows courts to validate
"acts performed by a person acting under the color of official title even though it is
later discovered that the legality of that person's appointment or election to office
is deficient." Id.
231 Id. at 187-88.
2 32
Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 654 (1997).
233 Id. at 655-56.
234 Id. at 660-61.
235 Id. at 662.
228

229
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officers. 23 6 In effect, determining the inferior officer status requires
more than just looking at whether one holds a "[lower] rank" or
"responsibilities of a [lesser] magnitude;" the key is whether one is
"directed and supervised at some level by others who were appointed
by presidential nomination with the advice and consent of the
Senate." 237 Edmonds provides the litmus test for distinguishing
between principal and inferior officers. 238
2. The Department of Justice Opinions
In addition to the case law just described, 239 another relevant
source, the Office of Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice
(DOJ), has addressed this issue, most recently in April 2007.240 After
extensive analysis, the DOJ concluded that a government employee is
a federal officer when that employee has a "continuing position"
established by law that involves the application of the sovereign
powers of the federal government. 241 "The question for purposes of
[this continuing position] is simply whether [the] position possesses
delegated sovereign authority to act in the first instance, whether or
not that act may be subject to direction or review by superior
officers." 242 According to the DOJ, it is not necessary that employees

Id. at 665. Justice Souter's concurrence argued that more factors should be
considered in determining whether these judges were principal or inferior officers,
but in the end agreed "that the judges ... are inferior officers within the meaning of
the Appointments Clause." Id. at 667-70 (Souter, J., concurring).
237 Id. at 663.
238 See. ej.g, Ass'n of Am. R.R. v. United States DOT, 821 F.3d 19, 38 (D.C.
Cir. 2016) (relying on Edmond to hold that because the arbitrator is not directed or
supervised by anyone, she is a principal officer who must be appointed by the
president with the advice and consent of the Senate).
239 See also Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978) ("There can be little
doubt that the role of the . . . administrative law judge . . . is 'functionally
comparable' to that of a judge. His powers are often, if not generally, comparable
to those of a trial judge: He may issue subpoenas, rule on proffers of evidence,
regulate the course of the hearing, and make or recommend decisions.").
240 See Bradbury, sunra note 134, at 3.
241 Bradbury, sunra note 134, at 1 ("That is, a position, however labeled, is in
fact a federal office if (1) it is invested by legal authority with a portion of the
sovereign powers of the federal Government, and (2) it is 'continuing."').
242 Bradbury, sunra note 134, at 19.
236
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have discretion or independent authority to be principal or inferior
officers. 243 "[T]reating discretion as necessary for the existence of an
office conflicts with the original understanding of 'office,' early
practice, and early precedents." 2 44 Citing historic authority, the memo
notes that officers "were persons holding sovereign authority
delegated from the King that enabled them in conducting the affairs
of government to affect the people 'against [their] will, and without
[their] leave.'"245 In contrast, a person whose position is "purely
advisory" or who "provid[es] goods and services" is not an officer. 246
In addition, in 1991, the DOJ concluded that the Department of
Education (DOE) ALJs were inferior officers because of their
executive policy-making role. 247 "By deciding a series of cases, the
ALJ presumably would develop interpretations of the statute and
regulations and fill statutory and regulatory interstices
comprehensively with his own policy judgments." 248 Indeed, to
ensure that the DOE ALJs were not principal officers, DOJ reasoned
that ALJ "final opinions" must be reviewable by the Secretary. 249
3. The SEC ALJs are Inferior Officers
With this legal background, there should be little doubt that
SEC ALJs are inferior officers. First, like the STJs in Fretag,
office of the SEC ALJ and the duties, salary, and means
appointment are all established by law. 250 Moreover, ALJs
permanent employees- unlike special masters. 251

the
the
of
are

Bradbury, sunra note 134, at 19. ("If it is not necessary to the existence of
delegated sovereign authority (and thus to the existence of an office) that a position
include the exercise of discretion, all the more is it not necessary that a position
include some sort of 'independent' discretion in carrying out sovereign functions.").
244 Bradbury, sunra note 134, at 18.
245 Bradbury, sunra note 134, at 8 (citing King v. Burnell, Carth. 478 (K.B.
1700)) (alteration in original).
246 Bradbury, sunra note 134, at 4.
247 Sec'v of Educ. Review of Admin. Law Judge Decisions, 15 U.S. Op. Off.
Legal Counsel 8, 14 (1991) [hereinafter Sec'v ofEduc. Review].
248 Id. at 8, 14.
249 Id. at 15-16.
250 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 556, 557, 3105, 5311; 15 U.S.C. § 78d-1 (establishing
ALJs and their duties, salary, and means of appointment). The SEC has argued that
243
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Second, like the STJs, the SEC ALJs perform more than
ministerial tasks: they regulate the course of proceedings, control the
record of the case, preside over the testimony of witnesses, determine
credibility issues, rule on the admissibility of evidence, issue
subpoenas, issue sanctions, exclude people (including attorneys)
the SEC ALJs are employees because the APA does not require the SEC to use the
ALJs. Gray Fin. Grp., Inc. v. SEC, 166 F. Supp. 3d 1335, 1353 (N.D. Ga. 2015),
vacated and remanded, Hill v. SEC, 825 F.3d 1236, 1252 (11th Cir. 2016). Likely,
the SEC made this argument because Judge Kavanagh noted this fact in his dissent
in Free Enterprise. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537
F.3d 667, 699 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanagh, J., dissenting) ("[T]here are good
reasons the Board and the United States did not cite ALJs as a precedent [for the
argument that dual for-cause removal provisions violate separation of powers].
First, an agency has the choice whether to use ALJs for hearings ... Congress has
not imposed ALJs on the Executive Branch."). However, Judge Kavanagh made
this point to respond to the issue of whether the dual for-cause removal provisions
were problematic, not to address whether SEC ALJs were inferior officers. Id. And
this point does not appear to be relevant to the issue of whether the ALJs exercise
significant authority. See Freytag v. Comm'r, 501 U.S. 868, 871 (finding STJs to
be inferior officers even though the Chief Judge of the Tax Court was not required
to use them). The SEC also argued that deference should be given to Congress's
view that the ALJ removal process is constitutional. Gray, 166 F. Supp. 3d at
1353-54. However, no deference should be given to congressional choices that
violate separation of powers, regardless of whether they are longstanding. See INS
v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944-45 (1983) (holding legislative veto to be
unconstitutional despite its longstanding use). "[C]ongressional pronouncements
are not dispositive . . . for purposes of separation of powers analysis under the

Constitution." Dep't of Transp. V. Ass'n of Am. R.R.,135 S. Ct. 1225, 1231
(2015). Whether Congress had a longstanding belief that ALJs were employees
should not be relevant to this Court in deciding the issues before it. Lastly, the SEC
suggested that ALJs are employees because they are placed in the competitive
service system. Gray, 166 F. Supp. 3d at 1353-54. However, placement in the
competitive service system is similarly irrelevant because that system includes all
positions in "the Government of the United States ... including [principal officers]
subject to Senate confirmation." Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 537-38 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 2101, 2102(a)(1)(B), 2014); cf. Com. of Pa., Dept. of
Health and Human Services, 80 F.3d 796, 804 (3d Cir. 1996) (noting that title is
not determinative of officer status; rather it is the nature of a position that must be
considered). The factors courts consider in making the decision of inferior officer
status are identified in Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 663 (1997);
Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881-82; Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 187-88 (1995);
Burnap v. United States, 252 U.S. 512, 516 (1920); United States v. Germaine, 99
U.S. 508, 511-12 (1878). None of these courts considered placement in the civil
service system.
251 See 15 U.S.C. § 78d-1(a).
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from hearings, enter default judgments, and make substantive rulings
and findings. 252 Indeed, the SEC has specifically chosen to give its
ALJs as much power as possible under the APA. 2 5 3 The SEC ALJs
are not merely compiling a hearing record for some higher entity to
resolve.
Third, like the STJs, the SEC ALJs exercise significant discretion
when carrying out their duties. 254 In short, the SEC ALJs have
significant authority and substantial discretion in executing the laws
of the United States. Moreover, the SEC ALJs may formulate
executive policy because as they decide a series of cases, they
interpret statutes and regulations, fill statutory and regulatory
interstices, and comprehensively make policy judgments. 255 This
finding was essential to the DOJ's conclusion that DOE ALJs were
inferior officers. 256
Fourth, like the STJs, the SEC ALJs exercise powers of the
government and have significant discretion in adjudicating
enforcement proceedings involving major sanctions. The SEC ALJs'
initial decisions regularly can and do become final, although the SEC
must act to make them final. 2 5 7 Rightly or wrongly, this factor was
held to be determinative in Landrv. 258 By regulation, the SEC ALJ's
initial decision becomes the SEC's final order when there is no
review of the initial decision. 259 In fact, in the majority of SEC
administrative enforcement proceedings there is no review; thus, the
SEC ALJ's initial decision regularly becomes the final order. For
17 C.F.R. § 201.111 (authority); 17 C.F.R. § 200.14 (powers); 17 C.F.R. §
201.180 (sanctions).
253 17 C.F.R. § 201.111 ("No provision of these Rules of Practice shall be
construed to limit the powers of the hearing officer provided by the Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 556, 557.").
254 See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 201.111 ("The hearing officer shall have the authority
to do all things necessary and appropriate to discharge his or her duties."); 17
C.F.R. § 201.232 (discretion to issue subpoenas); 17 C.F.R. § 201.320 (discretion
to receive and exclude evidence); 17 C.F.R. § 201.360 (duty to prepare an initial
decision, including "findings and conclusion, and the reasons or basis therefor, as
to all the material issues of fact, law or discretion presented on the record").
255 Sec'v of Educ. Review, sunra note 247, at 14.
256 Id.
257 See 17 C.F.R. § 201.360; 17 C.F.R. § 201.411.
258 Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1225, 1134 (2000).
259 See 17 C.F.R. § 201.360; 17 C.F.R. § 201.411.
252
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example, in 2014, the SEC ALJs issued 186 initial decisions, of
which 174 (approximately 94%) became the SEC's final order. 260
Further, the SEC ALJ decisions are subject to review directly by
principal officers, the SEC Commissioners. 261 Although these orders
are subject to review by the SEC, case law suggests that being
subject to reversal does not render an inferior officer a non-officer
employee. 262 Indeed, in the words of Justice Scalia in Edmond,
"[W]e think it evident that 'inferior officers' are officers whose work
is directed and supervised at some level by others who were
appointed by presidential nomination with the advice and consent of
the Senate." 263
In short, the DOJ's opinion, coupled with the Supreme Court
decisions in Freytag and the military cases, strongly suggest that the
SEC ALJs are "inferior officers." They appear indistinguishable from
military judges, the STJs, and even U.S. magistrates.
In Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board, the Supreme Court's majority opinion suggested
that whether SEC ALJs were inferior officers was an unresolved,
disputed issue. 264 However, "the Court has held that district-court
See ALJ Initial Decisions: Administrative Law Judges, Securities and
Exchange
Commission
(May
12,
2016),
http://www.sec.gov/alj/aljdec/aljdecarchive/aljdecarc2014.shtml.
[https://perma.cc/N8DZ-ATV5].
261 See 17 C.F.R. § 201.360(d).
262 See Freytag v. Comm'r, 501 U.S. 868, 881-82 (1991).
263 Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 663 (1997).
264 561 U.S. 477, 507 n.10 (2010) ("[O]ur holding does not address that subset
of independent agency employees who serve as administrative law judges ...
Whether administrative law judges are necessarily 'Officers of the United States' is
disputed.") (citing Landry, 204 F.3d at 1125); accord, Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at
699 n.8 (Kavanagh, J., dissenting) (stating that "many ALJs are employees, not
officers) (citing Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1132-34 (D.C. Cir. 2000) ("ALJs
in FDIC are employees because they possess only recommendatory powers that are
subject to de novo review by agency.")). Both Justice Roberts and Judge Kavanagh
cite only one case to support their assertions on this issue: Landry. Kavanagh cites
Landry to support his conclusion that "many ALJs are employees, not officers,"
Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 699 n.8 (Kavanagh, J., dissenting), and Roberts cites
Landry to support his assertion that "[w]hether administrative law judges are
necessarily 'Officers of the United States' is disputed," Free Enter. Fund v. Pub.
Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 507 n.10 (2010). Neither judge cited
the Supreme Court's most relevant holding that special trial judges for the tax court
260

654

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

37-2

clerks, thousands of clerks within the Treasury and Interior
Departments, an assistant surgeon, a cadet-engineer, election
monitors, federal marshals, military judges, Article I [Tax Court
special trial] judges, and the general counsel for the Transportation
Department are inferior officers." 265 It would not be a stretch to
include the SEC ALJs, or all ALJs for that matter, to this list.
B. Appointments
1. The SEC ALJs are Unconstitutionally Appointed
The Constitution provides that "Congress may by Law vest the
Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the
President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of
Departments." 266 Pursuant to this language, Congress must identify
which of these three entities will appoint the SEC ALJs, 267 who are
inferior officers. 268 By statute, Congress has identified that each
agency or department head shall appoint its ALJs. 269 The SEC is a
"Department" of the United States and its Commissioners function
collectively as its "Head." 270 Therefore, the SEC Commissioners
must appoint the SEC ALJs.
are inferior officers. See Freytag v. Comm'r, 501 U.S. 868, 869-922 (1991). While
neither judge thus suggests that Landry resolves this issue, anyone asserting the
SEC ALJs are "inferior officers" will need to explain why the reasoning in Landry
either was wrong or is not relevant to SEC ALJs.
265 Kent Barnett, Resolving the ALJ Quandary, 66 Vand. L. Rev. 797, 812
(2013) (citing Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 540 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing
cases));
see
also General
Counsel,
Central Intelligence
Agency,
https://www.cia.gov/offices-of-cia/general-counsel [https://perma.cc/HHC7-WPPF]
(suggesting that the CIA General Counsel is an inferior officer).
266 U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
267 The Appointments Clause applies to all agency officers, including those
whose functions are "predominately quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative," and
regardless of whether the agency officers are "independent of the Executive in their
day-to-day operations." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 133 (1976) (quoting
Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 625-26(1935)).
268 U.S. Const. art. II § 2, cl. 2.
269 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (2012).
270 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 511
(2010) (noting that "the common, near-contemporary definition of a 'department'
as a 'separate allotment or part of business" and that even though the SEC was

Fall 2017

The Shadow of Free Enterprise

655

However, the SEC Commissioners do not appoint the SEC
ALJs. 271 Because the SEC ALJs are not appointed pursuant to the
identified procedure in Article II, their appointment is
unconstitutional. 272 Even the SEC does not dispute that if the SEC
ALJs are inferior officers, then the current appointment process likely
violates the Constitution. 273 The SEC argues that its ALJs are not
inferior officers but mere employees. 274
2. Why the SEC Will Not Fix the Unconstitutional Appointments
There may be a relatively "easy cure" to this constitutional
infirmity-the SEC Commissioners could simply appoint the current
ALJs directly, as the Secretary of Transportation did after Weiss.275
275However, the SEC has so far refused to take this simple corrective
measure. 276 It is unclear why; however, it is possible that the SEC is
created as an independent agency, "[b]ecause the Commission is a freestanding
component of the Executive Branch, not subordinate to or contained within any
other such component, it constitutes a 'Departmen[t]' for the purposes of the
Appointments Clause.").
271 Timbervest, LLC v. SEC, No. 1:15-CV-2106-LMM, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 132082, at *35 (N.D. Ga. Aug 4, 2015); Transcript of Oral Argument at
25-26, Tilton v. SEC, No. 15-CV-2472 (RA), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85015
(S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2015), aff'd 824 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 2016) (No. 15-CV-2472RA) [hereinafter Tilton Transcript] (The SEC's attorney "acknowledge[d] that the
commissioners were not the ones who appointed [the ALJ presiding in that case].").
272 See Timbervest, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132082, at *35.
273 Tilton Transcript, sunra note 271, at 29 (The judge asked the SEC's
attorney, "If I find that the ALJs are inferior officers, do you necessarily lose?" To
which the attorney responded, "We acknowledge that, your Honor, if this Court
were to find ALJ Foelk to be an inferior officer, that would make it more likely that
the plaintiffs can succeed on the merits for the Article II challenge . . ..").
274 Hill v. SEC, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1317 (N.D. Ga. 2015), vacated and
remanded 825 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2016) ("[T]he SEC contends ALJs are 'mere
employees' based upon Congress's treatment of them and the fact that they cannot
issue final orders and do not have contempt power."); but see Hill v. SEC, 825 F.3d
1236, 1252 (11th Cir. 2016) ("vacat[ing] the district court's preliminary injunction
orders and remand[ing] with instructions to dismiss each case for lack of
jurisdiction" because Congress intended "to channel all objections to a final
Commission order ... into the administrative forum.").
275 See id. at 1320; Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 654 (1997).
276 Duka v. SEC, No. 15 Civ. 357 (RMB)(SN), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
124444, at *65 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2015) (referencing its previous decision in
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concerned that such an action would be tantamount to an admission
that the appointment process was unconstitutional. With such an
admission, pending and existing SEC orders could be subject to
challenge.
The SEC's concern may have validity. In 2014, the Supreme
Court decided NLRB v. Noel Canning. 277 In that case, the Supreme
Court held that President Obama improperly appointed three
commissioners to the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) using
the recess process. 278 The Court held that the commissioners'
appointments were invalid, because the Senate was not in recess
when the appointments were made. 279 The Court's decision
immediately affected Noel Canning by invalidating the NLRB's
decision that that company had engaged in an unfair labor practice. 280
But the Court's holding had a much more significant impact. All the
cases the NLRB had resolved in the eighteen-month period between
January 4, 2012, (the day the President made the invalid recess
appointments) and August 5, 2013, (the day the Senate confirmed
nominees for the vacancies) were potentially invalid. 281
The NLRB's response was swift. The same day the Supreme
Court issued its decision, the chair of the NLRB issued a statement
noting that the agency would "analyz[e] the impact that the Court's
decision has on Board cases in which the January 2012 recess
appointees participated." 2 82 He further emphasized that the NLRB

Duka v. SEC, No. 15 Civ. 357 (RMB)(SN), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100999, at *8
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2015), where the SEC refused to cure the Appointments Clause
violation).
277 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2550 (2014).
278 Id. at 2556-57.
279 Id. (holding that a three day vacancy was too short to be considered a
recess).
280 Mark L. Shapiro et al., The Supreme Court's Noel Canning Decision and
the
NLRB's
Response,
Mondaq
(July
17,
2014),
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/328048/employee+rights+labour+relations/
The+Supreme+Courts+Noel+Canning+Decision+and+the+NLRBs+Response
[https://perma.cc/KSG9-ECMN] [hereinafter Noel Canning Decision].
281 Noel Canning Decision, sunra note 280.
282 Statement of NLRB Chairman Mark Gaston Pearce on the Supreme Court's
Noel Canning Decision, NLRB Office of Public Affairs (June 26, 2014),
https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-story/statement-nrb-chairman-markgaston-pearce-supreme-courts-noel-canning/ [https://perma.cc/X528-H5GK].
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"[was] committed to resolving any cases affected by [the Court's]
decision as expeditiously as possible." 283 Shortly thereafter, the
NLRB modified or set aside orders in forty-three cases pending in
federal court and filed motions to vacate orders on appeal in fortynine other pending cases. 2 84 Additionally, the NLRB promised to
reexamine all orders not yet appealed to federal court. 285 Finally, the
NLRB had to evaluate whether its appointment of some regional
directors and the actions of those regional directors were valid. 2 8 6 In
sum, the short-term and long-term consequences of the Noel Canning
decision were far more complex than the Court likely anticipated
when it claimed that its holding would not "render illegitimate
thousands of recess appointments reaching all the way back to the
founding era." 287 Moreover, the aftermath of Noel Canning was not
the first time the NLRB had to revisit the validity of its orders. In
2010, in New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, the Supreme Court held
that the NLRB lacked authority to issue orders without a quorum. 288
In response, the NLRB simply re-issued all of the orders that had
been issued by the two-member panels. 289
In these two instances, the timeframes and, hence, the number of
affected orders, were relatively small. If a court concludes that the
SEC is appointing its ALJs in a manner that violates the Constitution,
the impact will likely be more substantial. It is unclear how long the
SEC has been appointing its ALJs in this manner and, thus, how
many orders pending and issued would be potentially invalid. 290
Thus, the SEC may rightly be concerned with appearing to concede

Id.
Noel Canning Decision, sunra note 280.
285 Id.
286 Id.
2 87
NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550,2577 (2014).
288 560 U.S. 674, 676 (2010).
289 Noel Canning Decision, sunra note 280.
290 The SEC has so far refused to answer discovery regarding how long it has
been appointing its ALJs in such manner and how many orders these potentially
unconstitutional ALJs have issued. See Why the SEC's Proposed Changes to Its
Rules of Practice Are Woefully Inadequate-Part III, Securities Diary (Nov. 18,
2015), https://securitiesdiary.com/2015/11/18/why-the-secs-proposed-changes-toits-rules-of-practice-are-woefully-inadequate-part-iii/
[https://perma.cc/2LAHW9FH].
283

284

658

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

37-2

that its appointment process is unconstitutional or even trying to fix
something the SEC does not believe to be broken; the potential
impact could be staggering. 29 1
C. Removal
While the Constitution explicitly provides for the appointment of
principal and inferior officers, it does not explicitly provide for their
removal in most situations. 292 Rather, the Constitution contains only
one removal provision. That provision states that "all civil Officers of
the United States shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for,
Alternatively, the SEC Commissioners may take another approach. In
Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 684 F.3d 1332 (D.C.
Cir. 2012), the D.C. Circuit held that three copyright royalty judges who comprised
the Copyright Royalty Board were unconstitutionally appointed. The court resolved
the unconstitutionality problem by severing the statutory provision that authorized
the Librarian of Congress power to remove the judges. Id. at 1336-37, 1340.
Because the judges were not validly appointed at the time they issued the
challenged determination, the court vacated and remanded without reaching the
merits of Intercollegiate's challenge. Id. at 1332. After remand, the Librarian
appointed new copyright royalty judges, who reviewed the existing, written record
to resolve the remanded case. Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty
Bd., 796 F.3d 111 (D.C. Cir. 2015). The new judges refused to reopen that record,
allow additional submissions, or conduct new hearings because The Board decided
291

not to hold new evidentiary hearings because Intercollegiate had "fail[ed] .

.

. to

point to any instance of an exclusion of relevant evidence that affected the outcome
of the proceeding, or to any portion of the Final Determination that turned on
witness credibility." Id. at 116. The D.C. Circuit found "nothing in the proceedings
leading up to and including the new Board's determination that suggests a lack of
independence from the previous, constitutionally defective determination" and held
that review of the existing, written record by the properly-appointed panel was
sufficient in this case. Id. at 123. Cf., Doolin Sec. Say. Bank v. Office of Thrift
Supervision, 139 F.3d 203, 212-14 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding that the temporary
director of OTS, who was validly appointed, ratified an order issued by an
improperly appointed "acting director"); FEC v. Legi-Tech, Inc., 75 F.3d 704, 709
(D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that the remedy of dismissal was not warranted by FEC's
unconstitutional composition when the FEC reconstituted itself after the finding of
unconstitutionality and potentially "rubberstamp[ed]" its prior decision).
292 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 516
(2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[W]ith the exception of the general 'vesting' and
'take care' language, the Constitution is completely 'silent with respect to the
power of removal from office."') (quoting Ex parte Hennen, 38 U.S. 230, 258
(1839)).
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and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and
Misdemeanors." 2 9 3 The impeachment process is seldom used. 2 9 4

Officers are removed other than by impeachment. 295 How is removal
possible? Because the Constitution did not 'expressly take[] away'
the removal power from the President, the President is presumed to
have this power to oversee executive officers. 296
Because the President's ability to remove an officer is an
important means of controlling that officer,297 the removal power
compliments the appointment power. 298 The power is not absolute;
Congress may limit the President's removal power to ensure an
officer's independence. 299 The clash between the executive's desire
for unfettered removal power and the legislature's desire to limit such
power impacts separation of powers-the doctrine that helps to
ensure that each governmental branch maintains its own separate
function. 300 Congress has limited the President's ability to remove the

293
294

U.S. Const. Art. II, § 4.
William F. Funk & Richard H. Seamon, Administrative Law 60-61 (5th ed.

2016).
Id. at 61.
Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 492 (citing Letter from James Madison to
Thomas Jefferson (June 30, 1789), in 16 Documentary History of the First Federal
Congress of the United States of America, June-August 1789, 893 (Charlene Bangs
Bickford ed., 2004)).
297 Funk & Seamon, sunra note 294, at 60.
298 Long ago in Myers v. United States, the Court struck down a statute that
required the President to obtain the advice and consent of the Senate prior to
removing the postmaster general. 272 U.S. 52, 107-08, 118, 176 (1926). According
to the Court, the power to remove a federal officer necessarily accompanied the
constitutionally granted power to appoint that officer. Id. at 122, 126-27, 163-64.
The power to remove did not flow from the constitutionally granted power to
advise on and consent to that appointment. Id.
299 The Court in Humphrev's Executor v. United States, for example, upheld a
removal provision limiting the President's ability to remove a commissioner of the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) for "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance
in office," in part because the FTC was designed to be independent and free from
domination and control of the President. 295 U.S. 602, 619, 629, 632 (1935);
accord Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 693 (1988) (noting that "the congressional
determination to limit the removal power of the Attorney General was essential ...
to establish the necessary independence of the office").
30 M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in Separation of Powers Law, 86
Va. L. Rev. 1127, 1132- 33 (2000).
295

296
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SEC ALJs by providing for multiple levels of for-cause removal
protection. The question is whether Congress can do so without
violating separation of powers.
1. The Supreme Court's Removal Cases
Likely because the Constitution does not explicitly define the
executive's power to remove officers, the Supreme Court has
proffered conflicting direction in the cases it has examined since
Marbury v. Madison.3 01 The Supreme Court 302 first addressed the
validity of executive removal in 1839 in Ex parte Hennen. 303 In
Hennen, an inferior officer sought mandamus after he was removed
from his position as a district court clerk. 304 The Court rejected the
clerk's argument that his removal was unconstitutional under Article
II.305 The relevant statute contained no removal limitation, and the
Court refused to imply one. 30 6 Silence, the Court held, meant that the
executive retained full removal power. 307 The Court reasoned that
when Congress fails to provide for removal of inferior officers,
301 5 U.S. 137, 162 (1803) ("[A]s the law creating the office [of justice of the
peace] gave the officer a right to hold it for five years, independent of the
executive, the appointment was not revocable; but vested in the officer legal rights,
which are protected by the laws of this country."). The Court subsequently rejected
this statement as obiter dictum in Myers v. United States. 272 U.S. 52, 141 (1926).
302 While state supreme courts had addressed this issue, this case is the first
where the U.S. Supreme Court discussed executive removal. See. e.g., Avery v.
Inhabitants of Tyringham, 3 Mass. 160, 176-77 (1807).
303 Exnarte Hennen, 38 U.S. 230 (1839).
3 Id. at 256.
305 Id. at 261-62.
306 See id. at 258-59 (While the 1st section of the Act of May 18, 1820, 3
Story, 1790 did limit the tenure of certain officers to a four-year term: "[C]lerks of
Courts are not included within this law, and there is no express limitation in the
Constitution, or laws of Congress, upon the tenure of the [clerks'] office." Thus,
because the tenure for the office of clerks is not fixed, these officers are "removable
at pleasure.").
307 See id. at 258-59 (maintaining that because "[t]the Constitution is silent
with respect to the power of removal from office, where the tenure is not fixed,"
the tenure of the clerks' office "must be held at the will and discretion of some
department of the government, and subject to removal at pleasure," and "although
no power to remove is expressly given, yet there can be no doubt, that these clerks
hold their office at the will and discretion of the head of the department").
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because (1) the Constitution likely does not intend those officers to
hold term for life, 308 (2) the power of removal is incidental to the
power of appointment, 309 and (3) "[t]he appointment of clerks of the
court properly belongs to the courts of law," the courts would also
have removal power. 310 Hence, Hennen was out of luck.
Similarly, in Parsons v. United States, the Court again refused to
imply a removal limitation in a statute that did not contain one. 311 In
this case, the Court held that Congress had not intended to limit the
President's power to remove an inferior officer, a district attorney. 312
The relevant statute provided that "[d]istrict attorneys shall be
appointed for a term of four years" and did not contain any provision
addressing removal. 313 Like it had in Hennen, 3 14 the Court refused to
imply a removal limitation. 315 In refusing to imply the removal
limitation, the Court iterated the long understanding of both Congress
and the executive that the removal power was an inherent power of
the executive. 316 The Court then described the well-known battle over
the first Tenure of Office Act, which had prohibited the executive
from exercising any removal without the advice and consent of the
Senate. 317 Despite the fact that the Tenure of Office Act had been
repealed before Parsons was appointed, 318 the Court examined the
statute's drafting history and applied the constitutional avoidance
canon, refusing to imply any limitation on the executive's removal
power. 319
In the statutes at issue in Hennen and Parsons, Congress did not
expressly limit the removal power of the entity appointing the
308

Id. at 259.

Hennen, 38 U.S. at 259.
310 Id. at 258.
311 Parsons v. United States, 167 U.S. 324, 338-39 (1897).
312 Id.
313 See id. at 327-28.
314 See Hennen, 38 U.S. at 258-59.
315 Parsons, 167 U.S. at 343.
309

3 6

1 Id.

With first Tenure of Office Act, Congress attempted to prevent the
President from removing officers "friendly to the views of congress." Id. at 339
(citing Tenure of Office Act, ch. 154, 14 Stat. 430 (1867)).
318 Id. at 342.
319 Id. at 343.
317
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inferior officers; hence, the Supreme Court refused to imply such a
limitation in either statute. In contrast, in United States v. Perkins, the
Court reviewed a statute in which Congress had included a removal
limitation in the statute. 320 In Perkins, a naval cadet, an inferior
officer, was honorably discharged because his services were no
longer required during peacetime. 321 He sued for accrued salary. 322
The relevant statutes barred his peacetime discharge except "for
misconduct." 323 The issue for the Court was whether Congress could
limit the executive's removal authority in this way when appointment
was vested in the head of a department rather than in the President. 324
The Court held that Congress could impose removal limits under
these circumstances. 325 According to the Court, when Congress
"vests the appointment of inferior officers in the heads of
departments, it may limit and restrict the power of removal as it
deems best for the public interest." 326 In other words, Congress's
power to vest appointments in an entity other than the executive
provided Congress with the concomitant power to limit that entity's
removal capabilities. 32 7 Notably, the President retained removal
power over the department head: the Secretary of the Navy.328
These early cases provided a framework for removal: the Court's
holdings in Hennen and Parsons suggest that because the power to
remove accompanies the power to appoint, the Court will not imply
removal limitations in statutes that do not contain them. In other
words, Congress must provide a clear statement that the executive's
116 U.S. 483, 483-84 (citing Army Appropriation Act of July 13, 1866,
ch. 176, 14 Rev. Stat. 90 (1866)).
321 See id. at 483.
322 Id.
323 Id. at 485 (citing Act of Aug. 5, 1882, §§ 1229, 1525, 22 Rev. Stat. 219).
324 Id. at 484 ("Whether or not Congress can restrict the power of removal
incident to the power of appointment of those officers who are appointed by the
President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, under the authority of
the Constitution (article 2, section 2) does not arise in this case, and need not be
considered.").
325 Id. at 485.
326 Perkins, 116 U.S. at 485.
327 Id.
328 Id. (the head of the department is the Secretary of the Navy); see Free
Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 494, 494 n.3
(2010).
320
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removal power is limited because no limitation will be implied. In
addition, the Court's holding in Perkins suggests that when Congress
explicitly includes removal limitations, the Court will uphold them,
at least when someone other than the executive holds appointment
power. Notably, in all of these cases, the Court examined the
legitimacy of removal restrictions regarding inferior officers; the
Court had yet 32 9 to address the legitimacy of removal limitations
regarding principal officers.
In 1926, in Myers v. United States, the Court addressed that
issue: whether the President has unfettered power under the
Constitution to remove officers "whom he has appointed by and with
the advice and consent of the Senate." 330 Plaintiff Myers was
appointed to be a postmaster in Portland, Oregon, for a four-year
term. 3 31 Before the term's conclusion, the President removed him. 332
Myers sued for his salary from the date of removal. 333 The relevant
statute provided, "'Postmasters of the first, second, and third classes
shall be appointed and may be removed by the President by and with
the advice and consent of the Senate, and shall hold their offices for
four years unless sooner removed or suspended according to law. '334
The Senate had not consented to Myers's removal. 335 The issue for
the Court was whether the removal limitation (requiring the advice
and consent of the Senate) was constitutional. 336 But a threshold issue
also had to be addressed: was Myers a principal or inferior officer?
The Court suggested, without really deciding, that Myers was a
principal officer. 337 The Court reasoned that because Congress vested
appointment of postmasters in the President with the advice and

In United States ex rel. Goodrich v. Guthrie, the issue of whether the
President had the power to remove a territorial judge was argued but not decided.
58 U.S 284, 302-03(1845).
330 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 106 (1926).
329

331

Id.

332

Id.

333

Id.

334

Id. at 107 (citing Act of July 12, 1876, ch. 179, 19 Stat. 78, 80, 81).

35 Id. at 107-08.
336
33

Myers, 272 U.S. at 107-08.
Id. at 158-65.
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consent of the Senate, the postmaster must be a principal officer. 338
This circular reasoning is likely incorrect. Like principal officers,
Congress has the power to vest the appointment of inferior officers in
the President subject to the Senate's advice and consent. 339 Unlike
principal officers, Congress also has the power to vest the
appointment of inferior officers in courts of law and heads of
departments instead. 340 Hence, the method of appointment should not
dictate whether an officer is principal or inferior. Regardless, the
Court understood Myers to be a principal officer.
The Court then held that Congress could not limit the executive's
removal power to remove officers exercising executive powers. 341 To
reach its holding, the Court examined in excruciating detail 342 the
views of the first Congress 343 regarding the nature of the executive
power and the importance of the take care clause. 344 The Court
concluded that for the President to have "confidence in the
intelligence, ability, judgment or loyalty of [his executive
subordinates,] he must have the power to remove him without
delay." 345 To require the President to file for-cause charges and
submit those charges to the Senate "might make impossible that unity
Id. at 163 (quoting Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U.S. 311, 315 (1903)
("Congress has regarded the office as of sufficient importance to make it proper to
fill it by an appointment to be made by the President and confirmed by the Senate.
It has thereby classed it as appropriately coming under the direct supervision of the
President and to be administered by officers appointed by him (and confirmed by
the Senate) with reference to his constitutional responsibility to see that the laws
are faithfully executed. Art. 2, sec. 3.") (internal quotation marks omitted)).
338

39 U.S. Const. art. II,
340 Id.

§ 2, cl. 2.

Myers, 272 U.S. at 163-64.
Or, as noted in a later case, "These opinions examine at length the
historical, legislative, and judicial data bearing upon the question, beginning with
what is called 'the decision of 1789' in the first Congress and coming down almost
to the day when the opinions were delivered. They occupy 243 pages of the volume
in which they are printed." Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 626
(1935).
343 Compare Myers, 272 U.S. at 109-35, with Parsons v. United States, 167
U.S. 324, 327-34 (1897) (describing the same history in fewer pages).
344 Myers, 272 U.S. at 108-09. The Court also cited the Commander in Chief
Clause, the Appointments Clause, the Impeachment Clause, and the Faithfully
Execute Clause. Id. at 108-09 (citing U.S. Const. art. II, §§ 2, 3, 4).
341

342

345 Id. at 134.
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and coordination in executive administration essential to effective
action." 346
But the Court did not stop there. Expansively, the Court extended
its reasoning to officers exercising quasi-adjudicatory powers as well:
Of course, there may be duties so peculiarly and
specifically committed to the discretion of a particular
officer as to raise a question whether the President
may overrule or revise the officer's interpretation of
his statutory duty in a particular instance. Then there
may be duties of a quasi-judicial character imposed on
executive officers and members of executive tribunals
whose decisions after hearing affect interests of
individuals, the discharge of which the President
cannot in a particular case properly influence or
control. But even in such a case he may consider the
decision after its rendition as a reason for removing
the officer, on the ground that the discretion regularly
entrusted to that officer by statute has not been on the
whole intelligently or wisely exercised. Otherwise he
does not discharge his own constitutional duty of
seeing that the laws be faithfully executed. 347
According to the majority, the President's unfettered removal power
thus flowed from the President's "constitutional duty of seeing that
the laws be faithfully executed." 348 Hence, even in the case of quasijudicial officers, the President must retain the power to remove those
below him.
The Court's reliance on the Take Care Clause gave the dissent
pause. As if foreshadowing the current controversy regarding the
SEC ALJs, Justice Holmes warned that "arguments drawn from the
executive power of the President, and from his duty to appoint
officers of the United States (when Congress does not vest the
appointment elsewhere), to take care that the laws be faithfully

Id.
347 Id. at 135.
348 Id.
346
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executed, and to commission all officers of the United States, seem to
[be] spider's webs inadequate to control the dominant facts." 349
The Court's holding and reasoning in Myers was consistent with
the Court's holdings and reasoning in Hennen and Parsons, in which
the Court had refused to imply removal restrictions because of the
inherent power of the executive to remove officers. However, the
Court's holding and reasoning in Myers was inconsistent with the
Court's holding and reasoning in Perkins, in which the Court had
upheld an express removal provision. To explain the different
outcome, the Court could have distinguished the plaintiff in Perkins
because he was an inferior officer. Indeed, Justice Roberts later
suggested in Free Enterprise that the nature of the officer's status was
determinative in these early removal cases. 350 Justice Roberts was
incorrect. 351
Instead, the Myers Court distinguished Perkins not by focusing
on the inferior nature of the officer in that case, but by focusing on
who held the removal power. 352 In Myers, Congress had retained
some removal power for itself; in contrast, in Perkins, Congress
merely placed "incidental" restrictions (for-cause removal during
peacetime) on the head of a department's ability to remove an
officer. 353 Such incidental restrictions on the executive were
legitimate, the Court reasoned, because Congress did not aggrandize
its own power at the expense of the Executive. 354 The Court
underscored that it had never allowed Congress "to draw to itself, or
349 Id. at 177 (Holmes, J., dissenting).

Free Enter. Fund. v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 510
(2010) (holding that "the Board members are inferior officers," because the
Commission has the power to remove Board members "at will").
351 See generally, Peter L. Strauss, On the Difficulties of Generalization
Pcaobi N the Footsteps of Myers. Humphrev's Executor, Morrison, and Frevtag, 32
Cardozo L. Rev. 2255 (2011) (criticizing Free Enternrise).
352 According to the Court in Myers, whether an officer is principal or inferior
should have no bearing on whether the limitation on the President's removal power
is constitutional; rather, the focus should turn to who holds this power in
compliance with the Constitution. See Myers, 272 U.S. at 164-76. So even though
the Court may have incorrectly held that the postmaster in that case was a principal
officer, when in all likelihood he was inferior, this difference did not matter to the
Court. See id. at 160-61.
353 Myers, 272 U.S. at 161.
354 Id.
-

350
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to either branch of it, the power to remove or the right to participate
in the exercise of [the removal] power. To do this would be to go
beyond the words and implications of that clause, and to infringe the
constitutional principle of the separation of governmental powers." 355
Hence, when Congress vests appointment power in an entity other
than the President, Congress can place for- cause restrictions on that
entity's power to remove an officer. However, when Congress gives
itself a role in the President's power to remove an officer, Congress
crosses the line.
The majority's holding in Myers soon proved to be too broad. In
1935 in Humphrey's Executor v. United States, the Court retreated
from this broad description of the President's removal power. 356 The
relevant act in Humphrey's Executor established the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC), an independent agency, and contained a forcause removal provision. 357 That provision limited the President from
removing an FTC Commissioner unless for "inefficiency, neglect of
duty, or malfeasance in office." 358 The FTC Commissioners are
principal officers. 359 Like it did in Myers, however, the Court ignored
the distinction between principal and inferior officers.
Despite the language in Myers suggesting that the President's
removal power was sacrosanct, the Court upheld the for-cause
removal limitation in Humphrey's Executor. 360 In doing so, the Court
acknowledged that the language quoted above regarding quasijudicial officers might suggest that the for-cause removal provision
was unconstitutional. 36 1 But the Court rejected the language as
dicta. 362 Instead, Myers, the Court said, was distinguishable in a
355 Id.

356 Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 632(1935).
357 The Federal Trade Commission Act, chc. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 41).
358 Humphrey's Ex'r, 295 U.S. at 620 (quoting The Federal Trade Commission
Act, c. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1,41)).
359 While the Court did not expressly state that the FTC Commissioners are
principal officers, it was implied because under The Federal Trade Commission
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41, 42, all Commissioners must be appointed by the President
with the advice and consent of the Senate. See id. at619-20
36 Id. at 632.
361 Id. at 632; see supra text accompanying note 347.
362 Humphrey's Ex'r, 295 U.S. at 627-28.
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number of ways. 363 The most critical difference between the two
cases was the type of power the officers exercised. 364 The Court
noted that the postmaster in Myers hadperformed purely executive
functions and, therefore, had to be responsive to the President. 365
Myers had no quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial power.366
In contrast, the FTC Commissioners in Humphrey's Executor
performed both quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers. 367 The
Court reasoned that the power the FTC Commissioners exercised
required that they be independent from the President. 368 Thus, the
Court expressly limited Myers, saying that Myers did not apply to
"an officer who occupies no place in the executive department and
who exercises no part of the executive power vested by the
Constitution in the President." 369
In addition to considering the nature of the officer's powers, the
Court highlighted two other important differences between Myers
and Humphrey's Executor. First, the Court pointed out that Congress
had intended the FTC and its Commissioners to be independent from
the President, unlike the post office and postmasters. 370 Second, the
Court noted that the FTC Commissioners' tenure was limited to
seven years. 371 Both factors further supported the legitimacy of the

363

Id. at 627.

36 Id. at 631-32.

Id.
Id. at 627.
367 Id. at 626, 628 (expressly "disapprov[ing]" statements in Myers that
suggested that the President had an inherent constitutional power to remove
members of quasi-judicialbodies).
368 Humphrev's Ex'r, 295 U.S. at 627-28 ("A postmaster is an executive
officer restricted to the performance of executive functions. He is charged with no
duty at all related to either the legislative or judicial power. The actual decision in
the Myers case finds support in the theory that such an officer is merely one of the
units in the executive department and, hence, inherently subject to the exclusive
and illimitable power of removal by the Chief Executive, whose subordinate and
aid he is.").
365

366

369

Id. at 628.

Id. at 628-30.
Id. at 623-34; but see Shrutleff v. United States, 189 U.S. 311, 316 (1903)
(holding that while an inferior officer had limited tenure, Congress had not
explicitly intended to limit the President's general removal power). Note that the
370
371
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removal limitations. Thus, the Court limited the Myers holding: no
longer did the President have unfettered authority to remove all
officers. After Humphrey's Executor, the President had unfettered
authority to remove "all purely executive officers." 372 Pursuant to
what we will call the Myers/Humphrey's distinction, Congress may
not limit a President's power to remove purely executive officers, but
Congress may limit his power to remove quasi-legislative and quasijudicial officers, especially when such officers' tenure is timelimited. 373
The Myers/Humphrey's distinction held firm for half a century.
For example, in 1958, the Court applied this distinction in Wiener v.
United States, to hold that Congress could limit the President's power
to remove a member of the War Claims Commission. 374 Wiener
refused to resign when asked to do so by President Eisenhower. 375
Wiener filed suit in the Court of Claims to recover his unpaid
salary. 376 The relevant act provided that the commissioners had very
limited tenure (three years). 377 The act did not have an explicit
removal provision. 378 The issue for the Court was whether the act
contained an implied for-cause removal provision. 379 You will recall
that the Court had refused in Hennen and Parsons to imply for-cause

limited tenure of the officer had also played no role in the Court's decision in
Hennen, Parsons, and Myers.
372 Humphrev's Ex'r, 295 U.S. at 628.
373 Id. at 631-32; Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 127-28 (1926). Some
commentators have suggested that the Court in Humphrey's Executor used a
functionalist approach. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Joan L. Larsen, One
Person, One Office: Separation of Powers or Separation of Personnel?, 79 Cornell
L. Rev. 1045, 1109 n.321 (1994). We are not so sure. At best, the Court may have
approached the separation of powers question from a functionalist approach (asking
how it could uphold the limitation), then crafted a formalist bright- line rule for
future cases. However, the Court based its distinction of the legitimacy of the
removal restriction on the type of power the officer exercised. Myers, 272 U.S. at
134-35. Such a distinction is classicallyformalist.
374 Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 356 (1958).
375 Id. at 350.
376 Id.
377 Id.
378 Id.
379 Id. at 351 (noting that the issue was a "variant of the constitutional issue
decided in [Humphrey's Executor]").
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removal limitations, but upheld an express removal provision in
Perkins. 380 Had the Court followed those three cases, the Court would
have required Congress to limit removal expressly. 381 However, the
Court did not cite Hennen, Parsons, or Perkins. Additionally, the
Court did not discuss whether the War Claims Commissioners were
principal or inferior officers and whether this difference mattered to
its holding.3 82
Instead, the Court cited Myers and Humphrey's Executor. 383 The
Court noted that Humphrey's Executor had limited Myers's holding
to apply only to "purely executive officers. 384 The War Claims
Commission was a quasi-adjudicatory body, and Congress intended
for the commissioners to be 'entirely free from the control or
coercive influence, direct or indirect,' of either the Executive or the
Congress." 385 The Court assumed that Congress, when it enacted the
relevant statute, 386 had been aware that the holding in Humphrey's
Executor rested on the purely- executive-power distinction; thus, the
Court reasoned that Congress's "failure of explicitness" in providing
for removal was telling. 387 By failing to provide a removal limitation,
Congress actually meant to include one, the Court reasoned. 388 The
Court held that the President had neither the constitutional nor
statutory power to remove a War Claims Commissioner, who is a
"member of an adjudicatory body." 389 In short, without
distinguishing, let alone mentioning, Hennen, Parsons, or Perkins, the
Court relied on the Myers/Humphrey's distinction to imply a removal
380 See supra text accompanying notes 305-306, 313, 315, 320,325.
381 Id.

382 The War Claims Commissioners are similar to ALJs, in that both have
limited quasi-adjudicatory power. See infra text accompanying note 389.

383 Wiener, 357 U.S. at 351-52.
384 Id. at 352.

385 Id. at 355-56 (quoting Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629
(1935)).
386 The relevant statute was the War Claims Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-896,
62 Stat. 1240, whereby Congress created the War Claims Commission but did not
include a provision for the removal of commissioners in successive legislation. Id.

at 349-50.
387 Id. at 352.
388 See id. at 353-54.
389 Id. at 356.
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limitation, even though Congress provided no clear statement that it
intended any such limitation. With Wiener, the pendulum on the
President's removal powers swung completely in the opposite
direction of Myers.
Similarly, in 1986, the Court applied the Myers/Humphrey's
distinction in Bowsher v. Syiar.390 In Bowsher, the Court analyzed
the constitutionality of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act. 391 That
Act authorized the comptroller general, a principal officer, 392 to (1)
determine whether the President and Congress were abiding by
federal deficit caps, and (2) implement cuts when necessary. 393 The
Act provided that the comptroller general could be removed by a
joint resolution of Congress, which was subject to presidential
veto. 394 The reasons Congress could offer for removal included
permanent disability, inefficiency, neglect of duty, malfeasance,
committing a felony, or committing other conduct involving moral
turpitude. 395 Like it had in the statute at issue in Myers, Congress had
again aggrandized itself by inserting itself into the removal process.
The Court struck down the Act, finding the removal provision to
be unconstitutional. 396 According to the Court, the comptroller
general's functions were the "very essence" of executing the law. 397
The Court reasoned that Congress could not vest authority to execute
the laws in the comptroller general precisely because Congress
retained the power to remove him. 398 According to the Court, the
legislative history was very clear that Congress had included the
removal provision specifically so that "[i]f [the comptroller general]
does not do his work properly, [Congress], as practically his

Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 724-25 (1986).
Also known as the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of
1985, Pub. L. No. 99- 177, 99 Stat. 1038 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 901 et.
seqs.).
392 See Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 722-23 (quoting the Constitutional provision for
principal officer appointment).
39 Id. at 732-33.
394 Id. at 728, 728 n.7 (citing 31 U.S.C. § 703(e)(1)B (1995)).
39 Id. at 728, 728 n.7 (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 703(e)(1)B (1995)).
396 Id. at 734.
39 Id. at 733.
398 Bowsher, 478 U.S at 726-27, 733-34.
390

391
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employers, ought to be able to discharge him from his office." 399
Although the dissent believed that the "for cause" removal
limitations effectively limited Congress's removal power, making the
Act constitutional, the majority disagreed. 400 The for- cause standard
was too broad and vague to limit Congress's power. 401 The Court
explained that after Congress passes a law, Congress can influence
the execution of that law only by passing new legislation or by
impeachment. 402 "The structure of the Constitution does not permit
Congress to execute the laws; it follows that Congress cannot grant to
an officer under its control what it does not possess." 403 In Bowsher,
as in Myers, the Court held that Congress did not have the authority
to retain for itself any ability to remove an executive officer. 404
Rather, because the officer exercised executive authority, the
President's removal power could not be limited. 405 As it had in
Wiener, the Court again ignored Hennen, Parsons, and Perkins.
Perhaps the Court did so because the relevant officer was a principal
rather than an inferior officer, although the Court did not mention this
distinction.
After Bowsher, the law seemed clear. The President needs the
ability to control executive officers that work for him so that he can
faithfully execute the laws; however, the President has less need to
control those who exercise quasi-adjudicative and quasi-legislative
powers. Hence, pursuant to the Myers/Humphrey's distinction,
Congress cannot limit the President's ability to remove "purely
executive officers," but can limit the President's ability to remove
quasi- legislative and quasi-adjudicative officers. Additionally, under
Perkins, Myers, and Bowsher, Congress cannot reserve for itself any
power over the removal of executive officers, but can limit the
removal powers of the heads of departments when they hold
appointment power. Whether an officer was inferior or principal
appeared irrelevant to the analysis.

399 Id. at 728-29 (quoting 58 Cong. Rec. 7136 (1921)).

Id. at 729-32.
Id. at 729-30.
402 Id. at 726.
403 Id.
404 Bowsher, 478 U.S at 726-27.
405 Id.
4oo
401
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Just two years after Bowsher, in Morrison v. Olson, the Court
abruptly changed course and rejected the Myers/Humphrev's
distinction in the case of a "purely executive" inferior officer. 406 The
act at issue in Morrison was the Ethics in Government Act. 407 In that
Act, Congress established the office of independent counsel, whose
function was to "investigate and, if appropriate, prosecute certain
high-ranking Government officials" involved in criminal activity. 4 0 8

The Act provided that the attorney general, a principal officer, could
remove the independent counsel, an inferior officer, only "for good
cause." 409 The Court examined whether the good cause limitation on
the Attorney General's power to remove independent counsel, by
itself, violated separation of powers and whether the act as a whole
"impermissibly interfere[d]" with the President's ability to faithfully
execute the law. 410
Under Perkins, when Congress vests the appointment of an
officer in someone other than the President, Congress can expressly
limit the removal of that officer. 411 Because Congress vested
appointment authority in the Attorney General, the good cause
limitation was constitutional under Perkins. Relegating Perkins to a
"see also" footnote, 412 the Court turned instead to its holdings in
Bowsher, Myers, Humphrey's Executor, and Wiener.413 The Court
noted that Humphrey's Executor was clear that the Constitution did
not give the President "'illimitable power of removal"' over all
executive officers. 414 And the Court stressed that "[u]nlike both
Bowsher and Myers, [Morrison did] not involve an attempt by
Congress itself to gain a role in the removal of executive officials
other than its established powers of impeachment and conviction." 415

Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 689-91 (1988).
Id. at 659 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 49, 591 et seq. (Supp. V 1982)).
408 Id. at 660 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-99 (Supp. V 1982)).
409 Id. at 663 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(1) (Supp. V 1982)).
406
407

410 Id. at 685.

411 See supra text accompanying notes 325-327.
412
Morison, 487 U.S. at 689, n.27.
413
414

Id. at 685-88.
Id. at 687 (quoting Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629

(1935)).
415 Id. at 686.
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The Court acknowledged that the independent counsel performed
a "core executive function[]." 416The Myers/Humphrey's distinction
would thus suggest that the removal provision was unconstitutional.
Rejecting the Myers/Humphrev's distinction as determinative for
inferior officers, the Court stated, "the determination of whether the
Constitution allows Congress to impose a 'good cause'-type
restriction on the President's power to remove an official cannot be
made to turn on whether or not that official is classified as 'purely
executive.' 417 While the type of functions an officer performs was
relevant to the analysis, 418 the Court concluded that the more
important question was whether the removal restriction "impede[d]
the President's ability to perform his constitutional duty [to ensure
that the laws are faithfully executed]. "419
The Court then turned to the question of whether the Act
interfered with the President's ability to take care that the laws be
faithfully executed under Article 11.420 You will recall that the Court
in Myers had reasoned that limits on the President's ability to remove
an officer, especially an executive officer, interfered with his ability
to faithfully execute the laws. 42 1 In other words, executive removal
provisions are prima facie evidence that the President is unable to
fulfill his constitutional obligations. In Morrison, the Court rejected
416 Id. at 669.
417
418
419

Id. at 689.
Id. at 691.
Id. The Court said:
[O]ur present considered view is that the determination of
whether the Constitution allows Congress to impose a "good
cause"-type restriction on the President's power to remove an
official cannot be made to turn on whether or not that official is
classified as "purely executive." The analysis contained in our
removal cases is designed not to define rigid categories of those
officials who may or may not be removed at will by the
President, but to ensure that Congress does not interfere with the
President's exercise of the "executive power" and his
constitutionally appointed duty to "take care that the laws be
faithfully executed" under Article II.

Id. at 689-90 (footnotes omitted).
420 Id. at 693.
421 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 163-64 (1926).
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this prima facie approach and analyzed whether the President's
ability to faithfully execute the law actually was impeded. 422
Rejecting the conclusion that the President's ability to faithfully
execute the law actually was impeded under this statute, the Court
reasoned that the independent counsel (1) was an inferior officer, (2)
had limited jurisdiction, (3) did not have tenure, (4) lacked
policymaking power, and (5) did not have significant administrative
authority. 423 Moreover, the Court noted that President retained the
ability to remove the attorney general without cause even if he could
not remove the independent counsel. 424 Hence, the good cause
limitation was a reasonable restriction on the President's removal
authority. 425
Because the inferior officers in Morrison were subject to only one
level of "for-cause" removal, this case left open the question of
whether more than one level of for-cause removal would be
constitutional. 426 In 2010, the Supreme Court answered this question
in the negative in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board. 427 The Court framed the issue as
whether "the President [may] be restricted in his ability to remove a
principal officer, who is in turn restricted in his ability to remove an
inferior officer, even though that inferior officer determines the
policy and enforces the laws of the United States?" 4 2 8 The answer,

the Court held, was no. 429 Dual for-cause removal provisions are
contrary to Article II's "vesting of the executive power in the
President" since "[t]he President cannot 'take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed' if he cannot oversee the faithfulness of the
officers who execute them." 430

See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 689-90.
Id. at 691-92.
424 Id. at 692 (observing that the President retains "ample authority" by being
able to remove the Attorney General at-will).
425 Id. at 689.
426 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 495
422
423

(2010).
427

Id. at 483-84.

428

Id.

429

Id. at 484.

430

Id.
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The Court in Free Enterprise examined the validity of a for-cause
removal provision in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (the Act). 431
With the Act, Congress created a private, non-profit corporation, 432
the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (Board), "[a]fter a
series of celebrated accounting debacles." 433 Congress sought to
tighten regulation of the accounting industry to prevent any further
such debacles. 434 Pursuant to the Act, the SEC appoints five members
to the Board for staggered five-year terms 435 and oversees their
functions, "particularly with respect to the issuance of rules or the
imposition of sanctions (both of which are subject to Commission
approval and alteration)." 436 The Act provided that the SEC
Commissioners could remove individual members of the Board "only
'for good cause shown."' 437 The plaintiff, a non- profit entity
representing accounting firms, sued, claiming, among other things,
that the dual for- cause removal provisions violated separation of
powers in light of the Board's "wide-ranging executive power." 438
Under Perkins and Morrison, a single for-cause removal
provision on inferior officers who lack policy-making power and do
not exercise significant administrative authority is constitutional. 439
So long as the President retains unfettered power to remove the
principal officers (here the SEC Commissioners), the President's
ability to faithfully execute the laws is not unconstitutionally

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
According to the statute, Board members are not Government "officer[s] or
employee[s]." Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S.
477, 484 (2010) (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 7211(a), (b) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)).
Although the Board members are not Government officials for statutory purposes,
the Board is "part of the Government" for constitutional purposes. Id. at 485-86.
433 Id. at 484.
434 Id.
435 Id.
436 Id. at 486 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 7217(b)-(c) (2006)).
437 Id.
438 Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 487.
439 Id. at 494-95, 508 (noting that "restricting certain officers to a single level
of insulation from the President . .. would have no effect, absent a congressional
determination to the contrary, on the validity of any officer's continuance in
office").
431

432
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impeded. However, the parties had stipulated that the SEC
Commissioners themselves were also removable only for cause. 440
Notably, this stipulation may be wrong. There is no statute
limiting the SEC Commissioners' removal, as there was in
Humphrey's Executor, likely because the statute establishing the
SEC was enacted at a time when Congress assumed that for-cause
removal provisions would violate the Constitution. 441 Without an
explicit removal limitation in the statute, possibly a president would
have the ability to remove a Commissioner for any reason because
under Hennen and Parsons removal provisions are generally not
implied. 442 Because the parties stipulated that the SEC
Commissioners were only removable for cause, however, the Court
presumed that the members of the Board had dual for-cause removal
protection; these inferior officers could only be removed for-cause by
principal officers who also could only be removed for cause. 443 In
dissent, Justice Breyer noted that whether the SEC Commissioners
have tenure protection was such a critical finding to the majority's
holding that it should not have been based on the parties'
stipulation. 444
Although the majority should not have accepted the stipulation,
the second for-cause level of protection proved to be the Act's
undoing. In finding that dual for-cause removal protections impeded
the President's ability to faithfully execute the laws, the majority
returned to the Myers/Humphrey's distinction it had recently rejected
in Morrison. 445 The Court noted that "the power of appointing,
overseeing, and controlling those who execute the laws" is a
440 Id. at 487 ("The parties agree that the Commissioners cannot themselves be
removed by the President except under the Humphrev's Executor standard of
'inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office."') (citation omitted). One
wonders why the Court did not apply the constitutional avoidance doctrine and
interpret the statute to not include for-cause removal, thereby avoiding the removal
question. It appears that the majority was set on reviewing the constitutionality of
this very powerful board.
441 See id.; see also id. at 518 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
442 But see Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 356 (1958) (holding that the
President's power to remove a War Claims Commissioner was impliedly limited
even though the statute was silent regarding removal).
443 Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 487.
444 Id. at 545-46 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
445 See supra text accompanying footnotes 416-419.
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quintessential executive act. 446 Myers, the majority noted, reaffirmed
the principle that the President must have some power to remove
those officers for whom he is responsible. 447 Pointing to Humphrey's
Executor, the majority noted that Congress could confer good-cause
tenure on officers who acted in a "quasi-legislative and quasijudicial" capacity, rather than in a "purely executive" capacity. 448
But here, the majority concluded, the Board members exercised
executive power. 449
After resurrecting the defunct Myers/Humphrev's distinction, the
majority examined whether the Board members were principal or
inferior officers. The majority interpreted Humphrey's Executor as
holding that Congress could confer good-cause tenure on quasilegislative and quasi- judicial principal officers. 450 Notably, the
majority explained, the Court in "Humphrey's Executor did not
address the removal of inferior officers." 451 The majority pointed out
that pursuant to the Constitution, Congress can vest the appointment
of inferior officers in the heads of departments. 452 When Congress
does so, the majority continued, then the department head- rather
than the President-holds removal power, and Congress can limit the
department head's removal power, under Perkins. 453
(1)The majority then turned to Morrison which, you will recall,
had rejected the Myers/Humphrey's distinction for inferior
officers. 454 In Morrison, the Court examined factors to determine
when removal provisions would impede a President's ability to
faithfully execute the laws. 4 5 5 Removal provisions do not impede a
President's power when the officer (1) is inferior, has limited
jurisdiction, (3) does not have tenure, (4) lacks policymaking power,
Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 480 (quoting 1 Annals of Cong. 486 (Joseph
Hales ed., 1834)).
447 Id. at 492-93.
448 Id. at 493 (quoting Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 62729 (1935)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
446

449

Id. at 498.

Id. at 493 (quoting Humphrey's Ex'r, 295 U.S. at 627-29).
Id. (emphasis added).
452 Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 493.
453 Id.; United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483, 485 (1886).
454 See supra text accompanying footnotes 416-419.
455 Morrison v. Olson, 497 U.S. 654, 691-92 (1988).
450

451
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and (5) lacks significant administrative authority. 45 6 In other words,
the less important the officer, the more likely that a removal
limitation will be valid. Examining these factors, the Free Enterprise
majority noted that the Board members were inferior officers; thus,
the first factor was met.45 7 However, the majority did not examine
any of the four remaining Morrison factors, at least not clearly. 45 8
Instead, the Court focused on the ability of the President to
supervise and control the Board members in light of the multiple
removal provisions. 459 The majority noted that one level of for- cause
removal on executive inferior officers would be constitutional,
because the President retained the power to remove the principal
officers if they failed to remove an incompetent inferior officer. 460
However, the added layer of tenure protection in the case of the
Board was problematic, because the President would be unable to
remove either the incompetent Board members or the SEC
Commissioners who failed to remove the incompetent Board
members. 4 61 The Court seemed particularly troubled because, not
only were there two levels of for-cause removal protection, but for
one of them, Congress had enacted "an unusually high standard that
must be met before Board members [could] be removed." 4 62 In sum,
one for-cause removal limitation on a purely executive inferior office
is constitutional. More than one is not.
Then, as if foreshadowing the controversy regarding the SEC
ALJs, the Court questioned: if two levels of for-cause tenure
Id.
Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 510.
458 The majority noted in a footnote that its option did not address ALJs
specifically. The majority distinguished ALJs from Board members because many
ALJs "perform adjudicative rather than enforcement or policymaking functions ...
or possess purely recommendatory powers." Id. at 507 n. 10. The footnote suggests
that Board members have policymaking power, though the footnote is not clear on
this point.
459 Id. at 495.
460 Id.
461 Id. at 496.
462 Id. at 503 ("A Board member cannot be removed except for willful
violations of the Act, Board rules, or the securities laws; willful abuse of authority;
456

457

or unreasonable failure to enforce compliance . . . ."). Id. at 505 (describing the

Board's for-cause standard as "a sharply circumscribed definition" that requires
"rigorous procedures that must be followed prior to removal").
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protection were constitutional, "why not a third?" 463 Where, the
majority wondered, does the Constitution draw the line? 4 6 4 The
majority criticized the potential "Matryoshka doll of tenure
protections" that would "exercise[] power in the people's name" if
multiple for-cause removal provisions were valid.4 6 5 In sum, the
majority concluded that dual for-cause tenure protections "subvert[]
the President's ability to ensure that the laws are faithfully
executed-as well as the public's ability to pass judgment on his
efforts. The Act's restrictions are incompatible with the
Constitution's separation of powers." 466 Minimizing the potential
effects of its holding, the majority simply severed "the
unconstitutional tenure provisions . . . from the remainder of the

statute." 467
Justice Breyer dissented. 468 He criticized the majority for
"fail[ing] to create a bright-line rule [which would cause] uncertainty
about the scope of its holding." 469 He worried that a broad application
of Free Enterprise's holding could dismantle the entire administrative
state by putting the "job security" of "thousands of high-level
Government officials . . . and their administrative actions and

decisions constitutionally at risk." 470 He specifically cautioned that if
all dual for- cause removal provisions violate the Constitution, then
the removal of more than 1,584 ALJs in over twenty-five agencies
would be unconstitutional. 471
The majority responded to Breyer's concern by suggesting that it
was unlikely that its holding would apply to ALJs, because "unlike
members of the Board, many administrative law judges . . . perform
adjudicative rather than enforcement or policymaking functions or

Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. at 497.
46 See id.
465 Id.
466
Id. at 498.
467 Id. at 508.
468 Id. at 514 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
469 Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. at 536.
470 Id. at 540-41.
471 Id. at 542-43.
463
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possess purely recommendatory powers." 472 Returning again to the
Myers/Humphrey's distinction, the majority said:
[O]ur holding also does not address that subset of
independent agency employees who serve as
administrative law judges .... Whether administrative
law judges are necessarily "Officers of the United

States" is disputed. [See Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d
1125 (D.C. Cir. 2000).] And unlike members of the
Board, many administrative law judges of course
perform adjudicative rather than enforcement or
policymaking functions . . . or possess purely
recommendatory powers. The Government below
refused to identify either "civil service tenureprotected employees in independent agencies" or
administrative law judges as "precedent for the
PCAOB. 4 73
The majority thus distinguished ALJs from the members of the Board
based on their quasi- judicial role and limited powers. It is unclear
whether Roberts was trying to apply the Myers/Humphrey's
distinction (executive versus quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial), was
referring to some of the Morrison factors (lacking policymaking
power and lacking significant administrative authority), or was
combining the two in a removal test mash-up. Regardless, he was
incorrect.
The members of the Board performed adjudicative
474
functions.
Additionally,
many ALJs have more than
recommendatory powers and have "important administrative duties
beyond pure adjudication." 4 75 As noted earlier, ALJs affect policy
when they adjudicate, which is one reason why the DOJ had
concluded that ALJs are inferior officers. 4 76
Trying to make sense of this footnote, Professor Kevin Stack has
suggested that Justice Roberts may have been trying to distinguish

472

Id. at 507 n.10 (majority opinion).

473

Id.

474

Id. at 531 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

475 Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S.at 535.
476 See generally Sec'v of Educ. Review, sunra note 247, at 14.
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Board members from ALJs by suggesting that Board members
perform adjudicative functions as well as executive and legislative
functions, while ALJs perform only adjudicative functions. 477
Possibly. But if so, Roberts expanded the Myer/Humphrev's
distinction to apply to removal limitations placed on inferior officers
(ALJs).
If this was what Justice Roberts intended, then he has seemingly
resurrected the formalistic Myers/Humphrey's distinction: if any
officer performs purely adjudicative, as opposed to purely executive,
functions, then additional removal insulation does not violate
separation of powers. None of the Supreme Court cases that applied
the Myers/Humphrey's distinction up to that time had done so in the
case of an inferior officer. In any event, the Court's response is dicta
at best and confusing at worst.
In sum, the Free Enterprise majority reasoned that dual for-cause
removal provisions violate the Constitution precisely because the
President is unable to remove either an inferior officer who fails in
her job or the principal officers who oversee her. 4 7 8 Rather, the
President would have to rely on both inferior and principal officers
always acting lawfully, competently, and faithfully. Pursuant to
Morrison and Humphrey's Executor, each layer of for-cause removal
would have been constitutional by itself; however, under Free
Enterprise, when Congress combines the two layers of for-cause
removal, the dual layers become unconstitutional. 479 As the D.C.
Circuit
Court in Association of American Railroads v. U.S.
Department of Transportation recently noted, "[J]ust because two
structural features raise no constitutional concerns independently
does not mean Congress may combine them in a single statute." 480

477 Kevin M. Stack, Agency Independence After PCAOB, 32 Cardozo L. Rev.
2391, 2412,2411 n.117 (2011).
478 Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 496.
479 See e.g., Ass'n of Am. R.R. v. U.S. Dep't. of Transp., 721 F.3d 666, 673
(D. C. Cir. 2013) vacated on other grounds 135 S. Ct. 1225 (2015), remanded to
821 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
480 Id. at 673.
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2. A Removal Framework
The nine removal cases described provide conflicting guidance,
but offer the following removal framework. The Court applies a
different test depending on whether the removal limitations affect
principal or inferior officers. For principal officers, the Court crafted
the Myers/Humphrey's distinction: a formalist test based on the type
of acts the officer performed. 481 Under the Myers/Humphrev's
distinction, Congress cannot limit the President's authority to
remove purely executive officers. 482 However, Congress can limit the
President's ability to remove quasi-legislative and quasi-adjudicative
officers. 483 The Court has never, however, considered whether
multiple levels of tenure protection for quasi-legislative and quasiadjudicative principal officers would be constitutional. And that issue
does not arise in regard to the SEC ALJs, who are not principal
officers.
Instead, the issue that arises with SEC ALJs is whether multiple
levels of for-cause removal on inferior officers are constitutional.
Recall that removal limitations for inferior officers are not implied;
that is the rule from Hennen and Parsons. 484 Next, Perkins tells us
that Congress can expressly limit the executive's removal power
when Congress vests appointment in an entity other than the
President. 485 But Myers and Bowsher caution that Congress can limit
the removal power of that entity so long as Congress does not keep
for itself a role in the removal process and so long as the President's
ability to faithfully execute the laws is not impeded. 486
One method the Court has used to determine whether a removal
provision impedes the President's ability to faithfully execute the
laws is to examine the Morrison factors: whether the officer (1) is
481 See supra Part III.C.1.
482

See. e.g., Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 135 (1926). Additionally, the

Court rejected Congress's attempt to assume removal authority over executive

officers. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726-27 (1986). But see Morrison v.
Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 686 (1988).
483 See. ej.g, Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 356 (1958); Humphrey's
Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 631-32(1935).
484 See supra Part III.C.1.
485
486

Id.
Myers, 272 U.S. at 161; Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 726-27, 733-34.
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inferior, (2) has limited jurisdiction, (3) lacks tenure, (4) lacks
policymaking power, and (5) lacks significant administrative
authority. 487 The less significant the official and her responsibilities,
the more likely that the removal provision will be upheld. No one of
these factors is determinative; rather, the Court's concern, as
explained in Free Enterprise, is that the President's ability to execute
the laws not be impeded. 488 And the President's ability to execute the
laws is impeded when there are multiple for-cause removal
provisions. The President must retain some ability to remove a
recalcitrant inferior officer, whether the President has the power to
remove that inferior officer directly or the ability to remove the
principal officer overseeing the recalcitrant.
3. The SEC ALJ Removal Provisions Violate Separation of Powers
Assuming the Supreme Court applies this removal framework to
the SEC ALJs, it should conclude that the SEC ALJ removal
limitations violate separation of powers. As noted earlier, the SEC
ALJs are inferior officers, not employees, because they exercise
significant authority and decision-making power pursuant to the laws
of the United States. 489
Because the SEC ALJs are inferior officers, the appropriate
approach, under Perkins, is for a court to ask first whether Congress
vested appointment power in an entity other than the executive and,
second, whether Congress expressly limited that entity's power to
remove the inferior officer without taking on removal power for
itself.4 90 For the SEC ALJs, Congress vested their appointment in the
OPM. 4 91 Further, Congress provided that the SEC, like all agency
heads, may remove its ALJs only for cause. 492 Thus, Congress vested
487

Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691-92.
488 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 496

(2010).
489

See supra Part III.A.3.

See supra Part III.C.1.
See Gray Complaint, sunra note 99, at ¶ 52 ("SEC ALJs may be appointed
by the SEC's Office of Administrative Law Judges, with input from the Chief
Administrative Law Judge, human resource functions and the Office of Personnel
Management.").
492 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (2012).
490
491
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appointment authority in an entity other than the President, limited
the removal power of that entity, and did so without retaining
removal power for itself. So far, so good.
Next, under Morrison removal provisions on inferior officers are
valid so long as the officer (1) has limited jurisdiction, (2) lacks
tenure, (3) lacks policymaking power, and (6) lacks significant
administrative authority. 493 And under Free Enterprise, in order to be
valid, these express removal provisions cannot actually interfere with
the President's ability to faithfully execute the laws.
Here is where problems arise. A court examining the five factors
identified in Morrison- whether the officer (1) is inferior, (2) has
limited jurisdiction, (3) does not have tenure, (4) lacks policymaking
power, and (5) lacks significant administrative authority 494-should
find that the SEC ALJs meet only two of them. The SEC ALJs are
inferior officers, 495 and they have somewhat limited jurisdiction,
because they can adjudicate only certain types of SEC cases. 496
However, a court would likely find that the SEC ALJs do not meet
the other three factors. When the SEC ALJs adjudicate cases, they
inevitably make policy, albeit their policy-making authority may be
more limited than purely executive officials. 497 Moreover, they hold
significant adjudicatory authority (it is unclear whether adjudicatory
authority is the same as administrative authority; Morrison did not
define administrative authority) 498 and have for-cause tenure. 499
Arguably, because the Morrison factors suggest that the SEC ALJs
are inferior officers with significant authority, the first level for-cause
protection provided to the SEC ALJs may well be unconstitutional.
This conclusion may seem unnecessarily formalist. A
functionalist would note that ALJs have served as the cornerstone of
the administrative system for many years. The ALJ system has
U.S. at 691-92.
494 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691-92 (1988).
495 See supra Part III.A.3.
496 See generally Sonia A. Steinway, Comment, SEC "Monetary Penalties
493 Morrison, 487

Speak Very Loudly," But What Do They Sav? A Critical Analysis of the SEC's
New Enforcement Approach, 124 Yale L.J. 209 (2014) (providing a list of
enforcement actions that the SEC brings).
497 Sec'v of Educ. Review, sunra note 247, at 14.
498 See supra note 455 and accompanying text.
499 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (2012).
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worked for years and affects a huge number of litigants who interact
with a huge number of agencies. The implications of finding the
current removal process for ALJs to be unconstitutional are
staggering. To take just one example, the Social Security
Administration (SSA) ALJs hear thousands of cases each year
dealing with social security benefits.500 To shut down the process
would have dramatic impact. In short, because ALJs have served
important functions for so long, it may seem counterintuitive to find
their appointment and removal unconstitutional now.
Yet, this argument is classically functionalist: if the system is not
broken and has worked thus far, why fix it? A similar argument was
raised in INS v. Chadha, in which the plaintiff challenged the
constitutionality of the legislative veto.501 Justice White, in dissent,
warned that without the legislative veto, Congress would have to
"either [] refrain from delegating the necessary authority . .. or ...
abdicate its law-making function to the Executive Branch and
independent agencies." 502 He worried that choosing the former would
"leave[] major national problems unresolved" while choosing the
latter would create the risk of "unaccountable policymaking" by
those who were not elected to perform that function. 503 Rejecting
these concerns, the Supreme Court nevertheless found the power
arrangement unconstitutional. 504 Despite Justice White's fears, the
majority's holding proved not to be "destructive," nor did it cause the
administrative world to fall apart.505 Similarly, here, the longstanding
nature of the ALJs' multiple for-cause removal procedures alone
cannot be the basis for finding an unconstitutional removal process
constitutional. Disrupting a system that is largely working should
factor into the solution, but should not be determinative as to whether
that system violates the Constitution.

5oo Social Security Disability Benefits: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Homeland Sec. & Gov't Affairs, 113th Cong. (2013) (statement of Debra Bice,
Chief Administrative Law Judge, Social Security Administration) (discussing the
hearings process).
501 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 928 (1983).

Id. at 968 (White, J., dissenting).
Id.
50 Id. at 955-58 (majority opinion).
505 Id. at 1002 (White, J., dissenting).
502
503
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Additionally, quasi-adjudicators, like the SEC ALJs, are arguably
protected from executive removal for good reason: to promote ALJ
independence. Before the APA was enacted, there was considerable
concern that hearing examiners could not exercise independent
judgment both because they were required to perform prosecutorial
and investigative functions in addition to their judicial work, 506 and
because they were subordinate to the agency heads. 507 So, Congress
included within the APA a number of provisions to help ensure the
independence of these hearing examiners, later ALJs. For example,
when conducting a hearing, an ALJ cannot be "responsible to or
subject to the supervision or direction" of employees or agents who
perform investigative or prosecutorial functions for the agency.508
Nor may an ALJ "consult [any] person or party," including other
agency officials, concerning a "fact at issue" in the hearing, "unless
on notice and opportunity for all parties to participate." 509 Moreover,
and at issue here, ALJs can be removed only for good cause
established and determined by the MSPB after a formal
adjudication.5 10 Finally, Congress ensured that ALJ compensation is
also free from executive control. 511 In sum, Congress rightly
concluded that effective adjudication requires that litigants believe
the process to be fair and the decision-maker to be impartial. 512 ALJs
must be free to adjudicate without threat of retaliation. 513 Protecting

506 See, e.g., Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 36-41 (1950).
507 Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 514 (1978) (citing Ramspeck v. Fed.

Trial Exam'rs Conference, 345 U. S. 128, 131 (1953)).
508 5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(2) (2012).
509 Id. § 554(d)(1).
510 Id. § 7521(a).
511 See generally 5 U.S.C. § 4301(2)(D) (2012); 5 U.S.C. § 5372 (2012).
512 Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975) (stating that biased decisionmaking is "constitutionally unacceptable,", especially in a system that "endeavor[s]
to prevent even the probability of unfairness"); Town of Winthrop v. FAA, 535
F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2008). After all, due process "demands impartiality on the part
of those who function in judicial or quasi-judicial capacities." Schweiker v.
McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 195 (1982) (citing Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238,
242-43, 243 n.2 (1980)).
513 A former ALJ alleged she felt pressured to rule in favor of the SEC and that
she was told to work under the presumption that the defendants were guilty until
proven innocent. Jean Eaglesham, SEC Wins with In- House Judges, Wall St. J.
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ALJs from arbitrary and retaliatory removal promotes independence
and impartiality. 514 Moreover, agencies can review de novo the ALJ
decision and reverse it if they disagree. Hence, again from a
functionalist standpoint, this one level of removal protection may not
only be constitutional, but welcomed. Justice Breyer certainly
seemed to think so. 515

Nevertheless, even if the initial for-cause layer of removal
protection is constitutional, it is very unlikely that the second forcause layer is constitutional under Free Enterprise. Focusing on the
two for-cause layers, the Court in Free Enterprise examined whether
multiple removal provisions actually impeded the President's
ability to supervise and control the Board members. 516 What was
particularly problematic to the majority in Free Enterprise was the
second for-cause removal layer; this layer prevented the President
from removing the overseeing principal officer of an
underperforming inferior officer. In short, the President could
exercise neither direct nor indirect control over an underperforming
inferior officer.
Like the Board members in Free Enterprise, the SEC ALJs are
protected by a second, and possibly a third, level of removal
protection. First, all ALJs, including the SEC ALJs, are protected by
statute from removal absent good cause. 517 Second, to remove an
SEC ALJ, the SEC Commissioners must first bring a good-cause
formal proceeding before the MSPB.518 However, these SEC
Commissioners may themselves be protected from removal absent
"inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office." 519 Third,
(May 6, 2015, 10:30 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-wins-with-in-house-

judges-1430965803 [https://perma.cc/J3X2-TS7X].
Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 514 (1978) (considering whether agency
employees had immunity from prosecution for allegedly ultra vires acts).
514

515 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 522
(2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting).

Id. at 495-96 (majority opinion); but see Zaring, sunra note 108, at 1191-95
(arguing that whatever the doctrinal problems with removal, ALJs are too
traditional to find unconstitutional now).
516

517

5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (2012).

518

Id. While other civil servants also receive hearings before dismissal, only

the ALJs receive formal hearings. See 5 U.S.C. § 4303(b)(1)(2012).
519 See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 487 (internal quotation marks

omitted); MFS Sec. Corp. v. SEC, 380 F.3d 611, 619-20 (2d Cir. 2004).
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members of the MSPB, who determine whether sufficient "good
cause" exists to remove an SEC ALJ, are also protected from
removal.5 20 In sum, for an incompetent SEC ALJ to be removed, first
the SEC Commissioners must refer the ALJ to the MSPB and
establish cause, then the MSPB must agree that cause existed. Hence,
presumably three levels of for-cause removal are present.
Assuming the above analysis is correct, the world of ALJs, and
the SEC ALJs specifically, must change. Because if the SEC ALJs'
removal provisions violate separation of powers, then likely all ALJs'
removal provisions violate separation of powers. In Free Enterprise,
the majority remedied the constitutional infirmity simply by severing
the unconstitutional language. 521 Severing the unconstitutional forcause removal provisions for the SEC ALJs will not be so simple.
The statute that includes the first level of for-cause removal
protection applies to all ALJs, not just the SEC ALJs. 5 2 2 If all dual
for-cause removal provisions violate the Constitution, then the
removal of more than 1,584 ALJs in over twenty-five agencies would
be unconstitutional. 523 In short, the potential repercussions of finding
the ALJs' for-cause removal provision to be unconstitutional are
significantly greater than were the repercussions for invalidating a
removal provision that applied to a Board with just five members.
However, there is an additional concern in the case of the SEC
ALJs specifically. The members of the MPRB and the SEC
Commissioners also have for-cause tenure. 524 Severing the SEC ALJ
for-cause removal limitation addresses only one of these potentially
problematic, multiple for-cause tenure protections. The Court would
still need to evaluate the intersection of these two remaining forcause removal provisions to ensure the two acting in concert do not
impede the President's ability to faithfully execute the law.

520 They are removable "by the President only for inefficiency, neglect of duty,
or malfeasance in office." 5 U.S.C. § 1202(d) (2012).
521 Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 509.
522 Id. at 540-41 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
523 Id. at 542-43 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
524 Id. at 487 (majority opinion) ("The parties agree that the Commissioners
cannot themselves be removed by the President except under the Humphrev's
Executor standard of 'inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office."').
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Justice Breyer expressed concern about the dismantling of the
ALJ system in his dissent in Free Enterprise. 525 Broad application of
Free Enterprise's holding, he warned, could dismantle the entire
administrative state by putting the job security of "thousands of highlevel Government officials ...

and their administrative actions and

decisions constitutionally at risk." 526 For Justice Breyer, multiple
levels of removal protection serve a legitimate role in protecting the
integrity of agency adjudications and should be upheld. 527 And the
majority appeared to concede as much in footnote ten when it
responded to Justice Breyer's concern. 528
However, if Justice Breyer is right, then Free Enterprise is
meaningless; its holding would apply only to those cases in which
Congress creates an agency within an independent agency and tenure
protects both levels. 529 To our knowledge, Congress has created this
unusual agency structure only once in our Nation's history, and is
unlikely to do so again. Indeed, ALJs seem quite different from the
PCAOB members. We cannot imagine that the Supreme Court
intended to issue such a narrow opinion. 530 However, the
Id. at 540-41 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id.
527 Id. at 536 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
528 Id. at 507 n.10 (majority opinion).
529 Recently, the D.C. Circuit cited Free Enternrise to support its holding that it
was unconstitutional for the CFPB to be headed by a single director whom the
President could not remove except for cause. PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin.
Protection Bureau, 839 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (reh'g granted Feb. 16,2017).
530 In any event, at least one court has agreed with Justice Breyer. The United
States District Court for Southern District of New York in Duka v. SEC, suggested
that the SEC ALJ's dual for-cause removal protections are likely constitutional.
103 F. Supp. 3d 382, 393-96 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). The court issued its ruling in
response to a motion for a preliminary injunction, so the court's analysis is
preliminary and short on explanation. In its reasoning, the court returned to the
Myers/Humphrev Executor's distinction. Id. at 394. The court noted that limiting
the removal of "'quasi-judicial' agency adjudicators [is] unlikely to interfere with
the President's ability to perform his executive duties." Id. at 395. Because the
Duka court applied the principal officer framework rather than the inferior officer
framework-specifically finding the SEC ALJs' quasi-adjudicatory nature to be
determinative-the court's conclusion lacks persuasiveness. Additionally, the
United States District Court for Northern District of Georgia noted that because
ALJs "likely occupy 'quasi-judicial' or 'adjudicatory' positions," it had "serious
doubts" that the two-layer protections are unconstitutional. See Timbervest, LLC v.
525

526
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composition of the Supreme Court has changed with the passing of
Justice Antonin Scalia. The conservative majority that decided Free
Enterprise is no more. Very likely, resolution of this important issue
hinges on the identity of the next President and that leader's
appointment to the Supreme Court.
IV. CONCLUSION

The SEC ALJs current structure likely violates the Constitution in
two ways. First, as inferior officers, the SEC ALJs must be appointed
by the President, courts of law, or a department. However, the SEC
ALJs are appointed by the OPM and the SEC Chief ALJ. This
appointment process violates the Constitution. How the SEC will
remedy this constitutional infirmity is not clear. Perhaps the
Commissioners will simply appoint the already-serving SEC ALJs to
their current positions, as the DOT did after Weiss v. United StateS. 531
Regardless of whether such a retroactive process would allow for
meaningful appointment as the Constitution contemplates, there is a
more fundamental concern. What about the validity of the pending and
issued SEC ALJ orders? 532 The effects from Noel Canning533 suggest
that such an approach may have a staggering impact.534
Second, as inferior officers, the SEC ALJs cannot be subject to
multiple levels of for-cause removal protection without violating
separation of powers. And unlike the statute at issue in Free Enterprise,
severing the unconstitutional provision will not be an easy fix. The
statute that includes the first level of for-cause removal protection
applies to more than 1,500 ALJs in twenty-five different agencies, not
just to the SEC ALJs. Hence, the repercussions of such a holding would
be significantly greater than were the repercussions for invalidating a

SEC, No. 1:15-CV-2106-LMM, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132082, at *35 n.10 (N.D.
Ga. Aug 4, 2015); Gray Fin. Grp., Inc. v. SEC, 166 F. 3d 1335, 1354 n.10 (N.D.
Ga. Aug. 4, 2015), vacated and remanded, Hill v. SEC, 825 F.3d 1236, 1252 (11th
Cir. 2016); Hill v. SEC, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1319 n.12 (N.D. Ga. 2015), vacated
and remanded 825 F.3d 1236, 1252 (11th Cir. 2016).
531 See Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 654 (1997) (discussing Weiss
v. United States, 510 U.S. 163 (1994)).
532 See supra Part III.B.2.
533 NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014).
534 See supra Part III.B.2.
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removal provision that applied to a Board with just five members.
Moreover, severing the SEC ALJ for- cause removal limitation
addresses only one problematic for-cause layer. Two more would
remain.
Hence, the constitutional challenges raised in these cases are far
from inconsequential. Thousands of ALJs may be subject to
unconstitutional appointment and removal provisions. And there is no
easy fix. The shadow of Free Enterprise looms large.

